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Executive summary 
This report examines the longitudinal impact of the UK national minimum wage (NMW) on 
firm productivity. We use the FAME dataset which contains firm level micro data to estimate 
firm-specific productivity measures and then aggregate them to the level of the low-paying 
sectors as identified by the Low Pay Commission (LPC). The firm-specific productivity is 
estimated from production functions within disaggregate 4-digit industries, comprising the 
low-paying LPC sectors, by employing a modified semi-parametric estimation algorithm 
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). In the estimation algorithm we control for supply and 
demand factors affecting firms and explicitly build into the model of the unobservable 
productivity a measure of the ‘bite’ of the NMW on the average wage distribution. Thus, we 
model explicitly the impact of the NMW on firm productivity through this input price 
channel.  
Given our analytical strategy of building into the estimated model of (unobservable) 
productivity all relevant factors affecting it, to demonstrating the NMW effects on 
productivity of the low-paying (LPC) sectors we follow Draca et al. (2010) unconditional 
difference-in-differences approach. Our results from difference-in-differences analysis show 
that, with notable exceptions, aggregate LPC sector productivity has been significantly 
positively affected by the NMW over a ten year period as the effects’ magnitudes vary by 
sector. In most of the sectors the impact is statistically significant and positive with the 
exception of hairdressing, leisure and agriculture where the impact is not statistically 
significant even though positive. Furthermore, we analyse productivity by firm-size groups, 
according to the LPC classification and find substantial heterogeneity in responses to NMW 
over time as the increases are more marked in larger firms. We obtain similar results using 
alternative labour productivity measure(s).  
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The impact of the UK national minimum wage on productivity by low-paying sectors 
and firm-size groups 
 
1 Introduction 
This report examines the longitudinal impact of the UK national minimum wage (NMW) on 
firm productivity. While there is a large body of research examining the impact of minimum 
wages on employment and (wage) inequality, minimum wage effects on firm and industry 
performance is a significantly understudied area. A consensus has emerged that the overall 
effect of NMW on the level of employment in the UK is broadly neutral (see Stewart, 2004 or 
Metcalf, 2008 for a survey of the literature). Therefore, the research has shifted to exploring 
other possible margins of adjustment. Wadsworth (2010), following several previous studies, 
analyses a channel through which the effect of minimum wage could be directed. Firms that 
employ minimum-wage workers could have passed on any higher labour cost resulting from 
the increases in minimum wage in the form of higher output prices. Further research on the 
NMW’s impact on firm behaviour seems to be a promising area as firms’ operations and 
productivity could also be affected. Galindo-Rueda and Pereira (2004) and Draca et al. (2005; 
2008; 2010) are among the few studies that have attempted to analyse the NMW’s impact on 
the UK firms. They generate indirect evidence to suggest that productivity may have risen 
more in firms that employ more low-wage workers while profitability has fallen in such firms 
after the NMW introduction. The findings call for further research given the fact that 
previous studies did not have an explicit focus on estimating firm productivity.  
Thus, in this report we set out to estimate consistent measures of productivity by 
explicitly modelling its link with the introduction of the NMW and then document the 
4 
 
relationship.
 1
 We use the FAME dataset which contains firm level micro data to estimate 
firm-specific productivity measures and then aggregate them to the level of the low-paying 
sectors as identified by the Low Pay Commission (LPC). These include several service 
industries, agriculture, and food processing, textiles and clothing manufacturing. The sectors, 
their overall position in the economy and employers’ estimates of the impact of the NMW on 
them are described in Table 1. These low-paying sectors are clearly those most affected by 
the NMW’s introduction.  
- Table 1 about here - 
We estimate production functions within disaggregate 4-digit industries, comprising 
the low-paying LPC sectors, by employing a modified semi-parametric estimation algorithm 
proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Previous studies attempting to link productivity and 
factors affecting it apply a two-stage approach. In the first stage authors estimate firm 
productivity, and in a second stage they proceed to link productivity to various factors such as, 
for example, the NMW. In our view testing for a relationship between (unobserved) 
productivity and factors affecting it, ex-post, is admitting that there is information that should 
have been used in the structural model of the unobservable while estimating the production 
function in the first instance. Therefore, in our modified algorithm following recent 
advancements in productivity estimation (Ackerberg et al., 2007; Katayama et al., 2009), we 
control for supply and demand factors affecting firms and explicitly build into the model of 
the unobservable productivity a measure of the effects (the ‘bite’) of the NMW on the wage 
distribution. Thus, we model explicitly the impact of the NMW on firm productivity through 
this input price channel.  
                                               
1 Forth and O’Mahony (2003) analyse the impact of NMW on labour productivity using industry rather than 
firm level data. They decompose their measure of labour productivity growth into capital deepening and TFP 
growth. For the period around the introduction of the NMW (1998-2000) the authors find evidence of labour 
productivity increases in the larger low-paying sectors, retail and hospitality as well as in hairdressing. The 
labour productivity growth is mostly attributed to capital deepening.  
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Our results from difference-in-differences analysis show that, with notable exceptions, 
aggregate LPC sector productivity has been significantly positively affected by the NMW but 
the effects’ magnitudes vary by sector. In most of the sectors the impact is statistically 
significant and positive with the exception of hairdressing, leisure and agriculture where the 
impact is not statistically significant even though positive. Furthermore, we analyse 
productivity by firm-size groups, according to the LPC classification, and find substantial 
heterogeneity in responses to NMW over time as the increases are more marked in larger 
firms. We obtain similar results using alternative productivity measures. 
The report is organised as follows. In section 2 we outline a theoretical framework 
specifying a model of unobservable firm productivity. The model recognises the effects of 
various supply and demand factors and provides a basis for explicitly accounting for the 
impact of minimum wages on productivity. In section 3 we discuss econometric problems 
and introduce our algorithm for estimating productivity. In section 4 we describe the data and 
report the estimated coefficients of production functions for each of the LPC sectors and our 
counterfactuals. We also perform difference-in-differences analysis and present, graphically, 
results of firm productivity by aggregate LPC sectors and firm-size groups. In section 5 we 
discuss the results in the context of relevant literature on the effects of NMW and conclude.  
 
2 Theoretical framework: minimum wage and firm productivity 
2.1 Toward a model of firm productivity 
We recognise several problems with measures of firm productivity and try to address them in 
the context of the effects of minimum wages on firms. Productivity can be estimated from a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, 𝑄𝑗𝑡 = 𝑒
𝜔𝑗𝑡 𝑓(𝑋𝑗𝑡 ), where 𝑄𝑗𝑡  is a physical output of the 
j
th
 firm in period t, 𝜔𝑗𝑡  is its true productivity (efficiency) measure and 𝑓(𝑋𝑗𝑡 ) is an increasing 
differentiable function of a scalar input index, which in turn is a constant returns function of 
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the vector of inputs employed by the firm. When 𝑄𝑗𝑡  and 𝑋𝑗𝑡  are observable and 𝑓(. ) is 
correctly estimated,  the productivity measure is recovered as the (Solow) residual 𝜔𝑗𝑡 =
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑗𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑓(𝑋𝑗𝑡 ).  
However, usually, information on output and inputs is imperfect. When information 
on physical output is not available 𝑄𝑗𝑡  is replaced with 𝑄 𝑗𝑡 = 𝑌𝑗𝑡 /𝑃 𝑡, where 𝑌𝑗𝑡  is a nominal 
value of sales (or value added) of j
th
 firm and 𝑃 𝑡 is an industry-wide output price deflator.
2
 
Thus, the productivity measure is calculated as  
 𝜔 𝑗𝑡 =  𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑗𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑃 𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑓(𝑋𝑗𝑡 ).
3
       (1) 
In equation (1) revenues (value added) depend on demand conditions and the competition in 
the market. This fact requires introducing a demand system describing consumer and 
producer behaviour. Following Foster et al. (2008) and Katayama et al. (2009) the demand 
for the j
th
 firm product is specified as 𝑄𝑗𝑡 = 𝑞
𝑗 (𝑃 𝑡 ,𝜃 𝑡 ,𝐷𝑡), where 𝑃 𝑡 is the vector of product 
prices charged by all active firms, 𝜃 𝑡  is a vector of quality indices for all products sold by 
active firms, and 𝐷𝑡  is total market size.
4
 Assume that current prices and product quality 
indices are common knowledge, firms are price takers in factor markets, and they apply 
Bertrand-Nash pricing in the product market. Further assume that firm j equates its marginal 
revenue product at input level 𝑋𝑗𝑡 ,  1 −
1
𝜂𝑗𝑡
 𝛾𝑗𝑡
𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝑋𝑗𝑡
 to its unit price, 𝑊𝑗𝑡 ; 𝜂𝑗𝑡 =
−𝜕𝑙𝑛 𝑞 𝑗 (𝑃 𝑡 ,𝜃  𝑡 ,𝐷𝑡)
𝜕𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝑗𝑡
 
is the firm j perceived elasticity of demand and 𝛾𝑗𝑡 =
𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑓 (𝑋𝑗𝑡 )
𝑑𝑙𝑛 𝑋𝑗𝑡
 is the firm’s returns to scale at 
                                               
2 The link between value added and sales is established via the multiplier  
1
1−𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝑚 𝑌𝑗𝑡 
 , where 𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝑚  is the value of 
materials and 𝑌𝑗𝑡  is the value of total sales.  
3 When input quantities are not observed a deflated measure of expenditure 𝑋 𝑗𝑡 =  
𝑊𝑗𝑡
𝑊 𝑡
 𝑋𝑗𝑡  can be used where 
𝑊𝑗𝑡  is the price of a unit bundle of inputs for the j
th firm and 𝑊 𝑡  is a industry-wide input price deflator. Because 
our focus is on labour input which is usually measured in number of employees we do not use the expenditure 
notation here.  
4 Klette and Griliches (1996) is an example of an earlier study where a demand system is introduced to deal with 
the aggregation problem when output is measured in revenue terms. Recent applications of this approach are De 
Loecker (2007) and Abraham et al. (2010).  
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the margin. Then the first order condition for profit maximisation can be written as 𝑌𝑗𝑡 =
 
𝜂𝑗𝑡
𝜂𝑗𝑡 −1
  
𝑊𝑗 𝑡
𝛾𝑗𝑡
 𝑋𝑗𝑡 . Substituting this first order condition in equation (1) gives: 
 𝜔 𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛  
𝑋𝑗𝑡
𝑓(𝑋𝑗𝑡 )
 + 𝑙𝑛  
𝜂𝑗𝑡
(𝜂𝑗𝑡−1)
 .
1
𝛾𝑗𝑡
 + 𝑙𝑛  
𝑊𝑗𝑡
𝑃 𝑡
 .5    (2) 
Equation (2) demonstrates that 𝜔 𝑗𝑡  depends on scale economies (the first and second 
term), mark-ups and demand elasticities (the second term) and deflated input prices (the third 
term). There are several channels through which the revenue-based productivity measure may 
be affected by demand and/or supply factors.
6
 Factor prices matter because firms burdened 
with high factor costs pass some fraction of them, depending on the nature of demand, on to 
consumers as higher output prices, driving up revenues per unit input bundle and creating a 
pass-through effect. On the other hand, productivity shocks that are common across firms are 
likely to reduce 𝑃 𝑡 and thus average 𝜔 𝑗𝑡  values will positively respond to general 
improvements in technical efficiency. If quality of heterogeneous inputs is not explicitly 
taken into account in cross section, 𝜔 𝑗𝑡  is likely to be positively correlated with true technical 
efficiency 𝜔𝑗𝑡  or higher quality 𝜃𝑗𝑡  given that factor prices reflect factor productivity 
(Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967). Further, if the production function f(.) is homogenous of 
degree higher than 1 (increasing returns to scale), from equation (2), relatively larger firms 
will appear less productive if (which is likely) they charge lower prices which represents a 
scale effect. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that firms with high efficiency or high product 
quality face relatively low demand elasticity 𝜂𝑗𝑡  because they possess relatively large market 
shares (Berry, 1994). Such efficient firms will be able to charge high mark-ups and, unless 
                                               
5 Note that 𝑓(𝑋𝑗𝑡 ) =
𝑄𝑗𝑡
𝑒
𝜔𝑗𝑡
; thus, the link between the revenue-based productivity measure and the ‘true’ technical 
efficiency measure is obvious.  
6 Recent studies, notably Foster et al (2008) find that 𝜔𝑗𝑡 -type measures are correlated with 𝜔 𝑗𝑡 -type measures. 
The key assumptions behind this result are: (i) firms engage in pure Bertrand competition (limit pricing); (ii) 
each product can be produced by multiple firms; (iii) products are homogenous with respect to quality; (iv) all 
producers face the same input costs; (v) all producers face the same elasticity of demand; and (vi) productivity 
shocks are drawn from an extreme value distribution.  
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this effect is offset by a strong scale effect, they will appear relatively more productive which 
constitutes a mark-up effect.  
It is important to point out that factor prices, and particularly wages in our analysis, 
besides the pass-through effect may also induce a mark-up effect through the second term in 
equation (2) because positive shocks to input prices have the same effect on marginal cost as 
negative productivity shocks. Thus, wage increases will drive up firms’ marginal costs and 
induce them to reduce their mark-ups (Draca et al., 2010) which will make these firms appear 
less productive. Thus, the overall effect of increases in wages due to the introduction of 
NMW on productivity will be determined by the interaction of at least two opposite effects - 
the pass-through and the mark-up effects - and is ultimately an empirical question about the 
magnitudes of the effects.  
 
2.2 The impact of NMW on firm productivity 
In equation (2) the impact of the input price 𝑊𝑗𝑡  on the productivity measure is of special 
interest, as our focus of analysis is on the effect of the introduction of NMW on productivity. 
Clearly, increases in the real value of the NMW will affect the price of labour and the wage 
distribution. The effects of minimum wages on wage distribution and employment has been 
extensively studied in the U.S. (Katz and Krueger, 1992; Card, 1992; Card and Krueger, 1994; 
DiNardo et al., 1996; Lee, 1999; Aaronson, 2001); for the case of the UK important studies 
are by Machin and Manning (1994), Dickens et al. (1999), Metcalf (2002), Stewart (2002), 
Machin et al. (2003), Machin and Wilson (2004). Most minimum wage models predict that as 
the minimum wage rises, the distribution of earnings will become more compressed. Findings 
on employment changes are more mixed but in general a weak positive or no association of 
minimum wage and employment is suggested. In the UK NMW case, no adverse 
employment effects have been detected in any demographic group (Stewart, 2004).  
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Studies of minimum wage effects on the wage distribution and employment provide a 
basis for us to hypothesise a positive link between the NMW and productivity. Such a 
hypothesis is consistent with findings that increases in the NMW are associated with a 
decline in dispersion of the wage distribution and often with an increase in employment. 
Machin and Manning (1994), Card and Krueger (1995), and Dickens et al. (1999) explain 
these effects by employing dynamic monopsony models of the labour market. From a 
different perspective, Hall (1988) shows that when an exogenous (instrumental) variable, 
such as minimum wage regulation, is correlated with the productivity (Solow residual) 
measure this provides evidence that the joint hypothesis of competition and constant returns 
is untenable. Furthermore, for the case of an instrumental variable that is positively correlated 
with output and employment, a positive correlation with the productivity measure will be a 
sign of market power or increasing returns. Conditions of competition with constant or 
decreasing returns to scale will be incompatible with a positive correlation of the productivity 
measure and the instrument.
7
  
The extent of labour market competition also has important implications for prices 
and thus for productivity (Card and Krueger, 1995). Under perfect competition, the wage 
equals marginal cost of labour. The rise in wages due to minimum wage regulation will result 
in a rise in marginal cost of production and ultimately prices. Under monopsony, the 
minimum wage can reduce marginal cost, since the firm no longer has to raise wages to 
attract marginal workers. Lower marginal cost will lead to a rise in demand for labour and 
hence an increase in output. Higher output should act to lower prices and, by equation (2), 
increase measured productivity, other things equal.  
                                               
7 In a recent study Wadsworth (2010) provides evidence for the NMW’s impact on prices, for the case of the UK. 
His findings are consistent with our model of productivity specified in equation (2) and the non-competitive 
markets argument. Evidence suggests that firms that employ NMW workers could have passed on some 
proportion of the higher labour cost in the form of higher output prices. This effect is stronger in several NMW 
domestic service sectors such as security, retail, hospitality and catering. A further finding and evidence is that 
firms do not appear to change prices immediately when the new NMW level is announced; rather the effect on 
prices appears to accumulate gradually over time. 
10 
 
To sum up, in the case of a cost increase due to the introduction of the NMW, all 
domestic firms producing the same product will experience a degree of cost pressure, which 
will depend on their exposure to the NMW, usually defined as the share of NMW labour in 
their productive effort (Draca et al., 2010). If spillover effects occur from the NMW, putting 
upward pressure on wages further along the wage distribution, as found in some cases by 
previous UK research (LPC, 2010) then the effects on costs will be magnified. Firms 
operating in competitive industries will be unable to pass on cost increases if substitute 
products do not face similar cost increases. Labour-for-capital substitution may also be an 
effective adjustment mechanism if labour is a substitute for capital, thus reducing the number 
of employees and encouraging productivity improvements. However, in service industries, 
the scope of labour-for-capital substitution is typically limited. Thus, service industries 
should be expected to experience greater upward pressure on costs. Further, the more a good 
competes with potential substitutes produced abroad not affected by the UK NMW, the 
harder it will be for UK firms to pass on cost increases and maintain market share, other 
things equal. Thus, firms exposed to international trade may be less able to pass on cost 
increases. At the same time many service industries, which typically are not internationally 
traded may be able to pass on cost increases and thus appear more productive. 
 
3 Econometric framework 
3.1 Empirical specification of productivity 
Equation (2) demonstrates that measured (revenue-based) productivity mixes idiosyncratic 
demand and factor price effects with efficiency and product quality differences. Producers 
can show high productivity because they are efficient, but it can also be driven by high 
producer-specific demand and/or idiosyncratic cost advantage. Thus, our estimation strategy 
is to directly build into the model of the unobservable productivity a set of variables 
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controlling for both demand and supply factors. Moreover as our aim is to estimate the 
impact of the NMW on productivity, we directly build into the model of productivity the ‘bite’ 
of the NMW using information from the observed wage distribution.  
We specify productivity of a firm j at a period t following Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
extensions outlined in Ackerberg et al. (2007) as a function ),,,,( tjtjtjtjtjt elakih  of the 
firm’s capital kjt, labour ljt, age ajt, investment ijt, and the market environment that the firm 
faces every period et, and treat the function non-parametrically in our estimation algorithm. 
Olley and Pakes (1996) derive the function for productivity by inverting the investment 
demand function of the firm which itself is a solution to the firm’s maximization problem.8 
The economic environment control et could capture characteristics of the input markets, 
characteristics of the output market, and industry characteristics such as the current 
distribution of the states of firms operating in the industry and the impact of industry (or 
national) regulations such as the NMW. The Olley-Pakes formulation allows all these factors 
to change over time, although they are assumed constant across firms within an industry and 
in a given period.  
In this analysis we extend the Olley-Pakes model of (unobservable) productivity in 
two ways. First, we extend the information content of the market environment control, at 4-
digit industry level, to vary by firm size and location and denote this by jie

, where a subscript 
index j is added and vector notation is adopted. Introducing a narrowly-defined group-
specific market structure in the state space allows some of the competitive richness of the 
Markov-perfect dynamic oligopoly model of Ericson and Pakes (1995). Note that introducing 
richer market structure in the productivity model does minimise the deviations from the 
                                               
8 The invertability of the investment function requires the presence of only one unobservable which Olley and 
Pakes (1996) refer to as the scalar unobservable assumption. This assumption means that there can be no 
measurement error in the investment function, no unobserved differences in investment prices across firms, and 
no unobserved separate factors that affect investment but not production. Note also that the monotonicity needed 
for invertability in Olley and Pakes (1996) to work does not depend on the degree of competition in the output 
market; it just needs the marginal product of capital to be increasing in productivity.  
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original Olley-Pakes scalar unobservable assumption, necessary to invert the investment 
function, and thus it may help with the precision of the estimates. The evolution of 
productivity through time is modelled here by a first-order Markov process, )|( 1jtjtp  as 
in the original Olley-Pakes paper.  
The impact of the NMW ‘bite’ is introduced by a measure of wage dispersion, which 
is constructed as the difference between log(wage) at the tenth and at the fiftieth percentiles 
following Lee (1999) who formally models the relationship between the ‘bite’ of the 
minimum wage and the observed wage distribution. He uses various log(wage) percentile 
differentials to measure wage dispersion. There are three cases of minimum wage impact on 
the wage distribution to be considered. First, there may be no spillovers and no 
disemployment which represents the case of censoring. The only effect of the minimum wage 
is to raise the wages of those initially making less than the minimum to the level of the wage 
floor. The second case is characterised by spillovers but no disemployment. This case occurs 
when minimum wage has an effect on higher percentiles. A third possible case represents the 
situation of truncation with no spillovers but full disemployment. In this case the minimum 
wage has no impact on workers with wages already above the minimum, and causes job 
losses for all workers with wages below the minimum. Lee (1999) demonstrates that in each 
of the three cases there is a nonlinear but monotonic relation between the (relative) minimum 
wage measure and the observed tenth-fiftieth percentile differential.  
We compute the dispersion measure at 4-digit SIC2003 industry level and by LPC 
firm size category.
9
 Table 2 summarises the dispersion measures for the ten LPC sectors with 
high incidence of NMW and for manufacturing and services composite counterfactuals, 
defined in the data section. Since its introduction in the UK in April 1999, the NMW has  
                                               
9 LPC firm size classification is based on number of employees and distinguishes four categories: very small 
firms with up to 10 employees; small firms with 10 - 49 employees; medium firms with 50 - 249 employees and 
large firms with more than 250 employees. In the analysis we use a simplified version of the classification 
where the very small and small firm categories are aggregated into one small firm category.  
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increased in real terms and previous literature has found this to be associated with a decline in 
the wage dispersion measure throughout the period. Location information, following Rizov 
and Walsh (2010), to control for geographical differences and agglomeration effects is also 
incorporated in the model of the unobservable as three categories of areas according to the 
DEFRA classification are distinguished (DEFRA, 2005): urban, rural less sparse and rural 
sparse locations. To control for business cycle effects a time trend is included in the model as 
well.  
- Table 2 about here - 
Next, we relax the scalar unobservable assumption all together following modelling 
ideas in Ackerberg et al. (2007) and an application to firm productivity and trade orientation 
by Rizov and Walsh (2009). We adjust the model of productivity to allow for exporting status 
to be an additional (endogenous) control variable in the state space jie

 that is driven by 
lagged productivity as in Melitz (2003). This formulation leads to modelling the evolution of 
productivity as a controlled second-order Markov process ),|( 21  jtjtjtp  , where firms 
operate through time forming expectations of future jt s on the basis of information from 
two preceding periods.
10
 Thus, the model of productivity is specified as the function 
),,,,( jijtjtjtjtjt elakih

 .       (3) 
Selection to exporting can reveal better productivity due to higher quality products, 
know-how, and distribution networks that are needed to overcome sunk costs to get into 
foreign markets. Furthermore, exporting firms are more likely to employ a higher quality 
labour force and pay higher wages (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). We specify the propensity to 
export as a non-parametric function of 1111 ,,,  jtjtjtjt laki  and a vector of other firm-specific 
characteristics such as type of ownership, corporate governance, and industry groupings as 
                                               
10 Note that the fixed effects estimator can be seen as a special case of the Markov process p(.) where 
productivity, jt  is set to j  and does not change over time. 
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well as a time trend. In equation (3), we add in the market environment vector jie

the 
propensity to export, estimated from a Probit model, rather than the observed export indicator. 
This allows us to treat the exporting decision as an endogenous control.
11
  
 
3.2 Estimation algorithm 
To compute unbiased and consistent firm-level (Solow-residual) productivity measures, we 
need to generate first unbiased and consistent estimates of production function parameters. 
However, estimating production function parameters is complicated due to the fact that 
productivity is not observed directly in the data and due to imperfect information about the 
supply and demand factors affecting the unobservable. The first complication arises because 
productivity determines input levels which is the classic simultaneity problem formulated by 
Marshak and Andrews (1944). The second complication arises out of the fact that firms 
survive based on productivity type, amongst other factors. If an OLS estimator is used, 
simultaneity means that estimates for variable inputs such as labour, when considered a non-
dynamic input, will be upward biased, assuming a positive correlation with unobservable 
productivity. Exit will depend on productivity types as well. Thus, the coefficient on capital 
is likely to be underestimated by OLS as higher capital stocks induce firms to survive at low 
productivity levels as far as the capital stock represents sunk cost (Olley and Pakes, 1996). 
Besides the two biases, a potential problem afflicting the productivity measure is associated 
with the spatial dependency of observations within a geo-space. Special dependency leads to 
the spatial autocorrelation problem since – like temporal autocorrelation – it violates standard 
statistical techniques that assume independence between observations (Anselin and Kelejian, 
                                               
11 Results from estimating propensities to export are available from the authors. Given the availability of three 
extra controls (propensity to export, location information and wage dispersion), besides the investment variable, 
we experimented also with a third-order Markov process but the estimation results were very similar to the 
second-order Markov process results reported in the paper. Thus, we conclude that a second-order Markov 
process approximates our model of productivity well. 
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1997). Furthermore, spatial dependency is a source of special heterogeneity which means that 
overall parameters estimated for the entire system may not adequately describe the process at 
any given location.  
To deal with the estimation problems outlined above we employ a semi-parametric 
estimation algorithm in the spirit of Olley and Pakes (1996) following extensions in 
Ackerberg et al. (2007) and an application by Rizov and Walsh (2009). As in Olley and Pakes 
(1996) we specify a log-linear production function,  
jtjtjtljtajtkjt vlaky  0 ,     (4) 
where the log of firm j value added at period t, yjt is modelled as a function of the logs of the 
firm’s state variables at t, namely age, ajt, capital kjt, and labour, ljt. Investment demand, ijt 
determines the capital stock at the beginning of each period. The law of capital accumulation 
is given by 𝑘𝑗𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑘𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 , while age evolves as 𝑎𝑗𝑡 +1 = 𝑎𝑗𝑡 + 1. The error 
structure comprises a stochastic component, vjt, with zero expected mean, and a component 
that represents unobserved productivity, ωjt as specified in equation (3). Both ωjt and vjt are 
unobserved, but ωjt is a state variable, and thus affects firm’s choice variables – decision to 
exit and investment demand, while vjt has zero expected mean given current information, and 
hence does not affect decisions. 
Substituting equation (3) into the production function (4) and combining the constant, 
kjt, ajt, and ljt terms into function ),,,,( jtjtjtjtjt elaki

  gives  
jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt verlakiy  ),,,,,(

 .      (5) 
Equation (5) is the first step of our estimation algorithm and can be estimated as in Olley and 
Pakes (1996) with OLS and applying semi-parametric methods that treat the function (.)  
non-parametrically, using a polynomial.
12
 Even though the first stage does not directly 
                                               
12 Olley and Pakes (1996) show that kernel and polynomial approximations of the unobservable produce very 
similar results therefore in our estimations everywhere we use a computationally easier 4th-order polynomial. 
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identify any of the parameters of the production function, it generates estimates of (.) . jtˆ  
is needed in the second stage, where we can write unobservable productivity as 
jtljtajtkjtlakjt lak   00
ˆ),,,(ˆ .    (6) 
Next, to clarify timing of production decisions we decompose jt  into its conditional 
expectation given the information known by the firm in two prior periods, t-2 and t-1, and a 
residual jtjtjtjtjtjtjtjt gE    ),(],|[ 1212 . By construction jt  is 
uncorrelated with information in t-2 and t-1 and thus with kjt, ajt, and ljt which are chosen 
prior to time, t. The specification of the g(.) function is determined by the fact that 
productivity follows a second-order Markov process as discussed in section 3.1. Note that the 
firm’s exit decision in period t depends directly on jt  and thus the exit decision will be 
correlated with jt . This correlation relies on the assumption that firms exit the market 
quickly, in the same period when the decision is made. If exit is decided in the period before 
actual exit occurred, then even though there is a selection per-se, exit would be uncorrelated 
with jt .
13
 To account for endogenous selection on productivity we extend the g(.) function 
following Ackerberg et al. (2007) and Rizov and Walsh (2009) as follows: 
jtjtjtjtjt Pg    )
ˆ,,(' 12 ,      (7) 
where jtPˆ  is propensity score which controls for the impact of selection on the expectation of 
jt , i.e., firms with lower survival probabilities which do survive to time, t, are likely to have 
higher jt s than those with higher survival probabilities. We estimate jtPˆ  non-parametrically 
using Probit model with a polynomial approximation. Note that we extend the state variable 
                                               
13 Note that the first stage of the estimation algorithm is not affected by selection because by construction, jtv , 
the residual in equation (4) is not correlated with firm decisions as it is not observed by firm managers. 
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set with location and trade status information which are important determinants of the firm’s 
exit decision; a time trend is also included.  
The capital, age, and labour coefficients are identified in the second step of our 
estimation algorithm. We substitute equations (7) and (6) into equation (4) using expressions 
for the estimated values, 1
ˆ
jt , 2
ˆ
jt  which gives us 
,(.)' jtjtljtajtkjt glaky        (8) 
where ),ˆ,ˆ('(.)' 22221111 jtjtljtajtkjtjtljtajtkjt Plaklakgg

    
encompasses the two 0  terms and jt  is a composite error term comprised of jtv  and jt . 
The lagged ˆ  variables are obtained from the first step estimates at t-2 and t-1 periods. 
Because the conditional expectation of jt , given information in t-2 and t-1 periods, depends 
on 2jt  and 1jt , we need to use estimates of ˆ  from two prior periods. Equation (8) is 
estimated with non-linear least squares (NLLS) estimator, approximating g’(.) with a 
polynomial.
14
 
Finally, having estimated unbiased and consistent production function parameters we 
are able to back out a consistent (Solow residual) productivity measure, which we call total 
factor productivity (TFP), as jtljtkjtjt lkyTFP 
ˆˆ  .
15
 In the model of unobservable 
productivity we have explicitly incorporated spatial and time dependencies by merging 
spatial interactions with disaggregated modelling of productivity at firm level. We also 
explicitly incorporated in the model a measure of the ‘bite’ of the NMW on narrowly-defined 
groups of firms, by firm size within 4-digit industries. In terms of verifying whether 
variations in the NMW ‘bite’ and in location and export status make firms more productive, 
                                               
14 Woodridge (2009) presents a concise, one-step formulation of the original Olley and Pakes (1996) approach 
using a GMM estimator, which is more efficient than the standard Olley-Pakes methodology. 
15 Estimating the age coefficient was only used to separate out cohort from selection effects in determining the 
impact of firm age on productivity and therefore we do not net out the contribution of age from TFP. 
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we have controlled in our model of productivity for market-structure specific shocks (such as 
demand conditions, factor markets, exit barrier) that are different by NMW exposure and 
across locations and export status. We note that these factors remain constant across narrowly 
defined groups of firms within a given industry and time period.  
 
4 Data and estimation results 
4.1 Data, production-function estimates, and productivity measures 
We estimate the production functions specified in section 3 using the FAME dataset from the 
Bureau van Dijk. The dataset covers all firms filed at Companies House in the UK and 
includes information on detailed unconsolidated firm-level financial statements, wage 
(remuneration) bill, ownership structure, location by post code, activity description, and 
direct exports. The data used in our analysis contains annual records on more than 360,000 
firms over the period 1994-2009. The coverage of the data compared to the aggregate 
statistics for the industries analysed as reported by the UK Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) is highly representative, as for sales it is around 80 per cent and for employment 
around 82 per cent.
16
 The sectors analysed are identified on the bases of the current 2003 UK 
SIC at the 4-digit level, following the LPC groupings of low-paying industries (see Table A1 
in the Appendix). We also create counterfactuals from both manufacturing and service 
industries. The counterfactuals are composites of a set of 4-digit industries which have been 
identified on the basis of limited exposure to the NMW using literature and expert opinions.
17
 
All nominal monetary variables are converted into real values by deflating with the 
                                               
16 Harris and Li (2009) argue that FAME is biased towards larger firms, particularly in the non-exporting 
populations. Even though we size-weight our aggregations over firm productivity we note this caveat. 
17 The industries included in the counterfactual are all 4-digit industry codes comprising the following SIC 2003 
2-digit industries: 23, 27, 29, 33, 34, 35, 40 for the manufacturing counterfactual and 64, 65, 66, 67 for the 
services counterfactual.  
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appropriate 4-digit UK SIC industry deflators taken from ONS. We use PPI to deflate sales 
and cost of materials, and asset price deflators for capital and fixed investment variables.
18
 
Our goal is to estimate consistent TFP measures at firm level, within 4-digit industries, 
and to document the evolution of the aggregate (and by firm size) productivity over the 
period of analysis. The analytical strategy implies that we run regressions within all 4-digit 
industries classified by LPC as low-paying sectors and in the set of counterfactual industries. 
The estimated samples for each LPC sector account for between 55 and 70 per cent of 
industry sales and between 52 and 70 per cent of employment in our data. After lags are 
applied and observations with missing values deleted, there are in total more than 160,000 
remaining observations. The correlations between the ONS aggregate statistics series and the 
estimated sample series are as follows: sales – between 0.90 and 0.96, employment – between 
0.90 and 0.97.  
The descriptive statistics calculated from the estimated FAME samples for the LPC 
sectors and the counterfactuals are reported in Table 3. We can compare average firm 
characteristics across the LPC sectors. The average value added is highest in food processing, 
security and retail while it is lowest in agriculture, hairdressing and social care. The value of 
fixed capital assets is highest in food processing, retail and hospitality. With respect to the 
rate of investment though, over the period of analysis, social care is leading with hairdressing 
and leisure sectors also relatively high. The largest firms by average number of employees 
are found in the security and cleaning sectors while the smallest exist in agriculture, 
hairdressing and leisure. In all sectors, except agriculture, a large proportion of firms are 
                                               
18 In section 2 we explicitly discuss the implications of using industry wide price deflators. We note, however, 
that allowing for endogenous trade orientation in the unobservable and introducing location information in the 
state space will control for a persistent exchange rate adjusted pricing gap across locations and between 
exporters and non-exporters in their use of inputs and their outputs within 4-digit industries. In addition, the 
inclusion of wage dispersion information to account for the NMW ‘bite’ will further control for price shocks. 
Moreover, Foster et al. (2008) find that productivity estimates from quantity and deflated revenue data are 
highly correlated and that the bias vanishes on average, while estimated average productivity is unaffected when 
aggregate deflators are used.   
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located in urban areas. The highest share of exporters is in the textile and food processing 
manufacturing industries. Exits are highest, especially at the end of the period of analysis, in 
2008, amongst retail, cleaning and security firms, as the latter are also characterised by the 
lowest average age.  
- Table 3 about here - 
A summary of the aggregated coefficients from Olley-Pakes second-order Markov 
process (OP2) and Olley-Pakes first-order Markov process (OP1) models, for the LPC sectors, 
over the estimated 4-digit industries is reported in Table 4. The aggregated coefficients on 
labour, capital and age reported are weighted averages, weighted by number of employees. 
Both coefficient sets from OP2 and OP1 models are broadly similar.  
We now discuss the coefficients from our preferred OP2 model. They demonstrate 
some differences across LPC sectors, especially between manufacturing and services with 
respect to the capital and labour elasticities. The coefficient on labour ranges between 0.50 
and 0.96 and is highest in service industries such as leisure and social care. The capital 
coefficient ranges between 0.06 and 0.28 and is lowest in the social care and leisure 
industries. The coefficient on age shows an interesting pattern; besides cohort effects it seems 
to capture variations in product quality across sectors associated with age and experience. 
Industries where the age coefficient has the largest magnitude are leisure, hairdressing and 
security. In Table 4 we also report aggregate means of the productivity measures calculated 
from OP2 and OP1 models as well as a labour productivity measure (LP); the three measures 
appear broadly comparable. The sectors with highest aggregate productivity using the OP2 
measure are security and retail while social care shows the lowest productivity.  
- Table 4 about here - 
Next we illustrate graphically our productivity results for the aggregate of all the LPC 
sectors and for aggregates of manufacturing and service sectors. The graphs in the first 
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column of Figure 1 show results from our preferred estimated model of unobservable 
productivity (OP2) for all the LPC sectors in aggregate while in the second column results for 
the aggregate counterfactual industries (manufacturing and services) are presented.
19
 Figure 2 
and Figure 3 similarly report results for the aggregate manufacturing and service industries 
respectively. The main message from Figures 1 to 3 is that the NMW seems to have had a 
clear and positive impact on aggregate productivity of the UK’s low-paying sectors over the 
ten-year period since its introduction. The elasticity of aggregate productivity with respect to 
NMW is around 1, with the productivity of service sectors being twice as sensitive as that of 
manufacturing to increases in the NMW. Thus, our graphical analysis suggests that there is 
indeed an interesting relationship between NMW and productivity which is worth more 
detailed investigation.  
- Figure 1 about here – 
- Figure 2 about here - 
- Figure 3 about here – 
 
4.2 NMW and aggregate productivity: difference-in-differences analysis 
Given our analytical strategy to build into the estimated model of (unobservable) productivity 
all relevant factors affecting it, to demonstrate the NMW’s effects on (LPC) low-paying 
productivity, we follow Draca et al.’s (2010) unconditional difference-in-differences 
approach. We identify a group of firms within an industry sector that are more affected by the 
NMW introduction than a control group. In the treatment group of firms, wages are expected 
to rise more due to the introduction of the NMW and thus the effect of NMW on productivity 
is expected to be larger. A treatment indicator variable is defined as T=1 for below - NMW 
                                               
19 We also present as a robustness check the graphical results for the labour productivity (LP) measure in  
Appendix 1, Figure A1 to Figure A3. The results presented are quite similar to ones presented in the main text 
but the statistical significance of the correlations is lower and the trends are weaker. The results with the OP1 
measure lie somewhere in between the OP2 and LP results and can be obtained from the authors. 
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firms in the pre-policy period and T=0 for a set of firms whose pre-policy wage exceeds a 
threshold equal to the NMW at introduction. Thus, the unconditional difference-in-
differences estimate of the impact of the NMW on average productivity (TFP) is  
  𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑁𝑀𝑊=1
𝑇=1 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑁𝑀𝑊=0
𝑇=1  −  𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑁𝑀𝑊=1
𝑇=0 − 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑁𝑀𝑊=0
𝑇=0  .   (9) 
In a similar manner, we estimate difference-in-differences for average wages to verify the 
impact of NMW on the wage distribution and difference-in-differences for average capital-
labour (K/L) ratios to aid our attempt to shed light on the possible sources of productivity 
changes. We evaluate the effects before (NMW=0) and after (NMW=1) NMW introduction 
in all LPC sectors, aggregates of the manufacturing and services sectors, and by individual 
low-paying (LPC) sectors.  
Empirically, we define our treatment groups as in Draca et al. (2010), based upon 
average remuneration information from FAME.
20
 We divide the total remuneration figure for 
each firm by the (full-time equivalent) average number of employees to calculate an average 
wage. The treatment group (T=1) includes low-wage firms, with an average wage of less than 
£12,000 prior to the introduction of the NMW.
21
 The comparison group (T=0) contains firms 
similar to the treatment group firms but with an average wage between £12,000 and £24,000, 
a level close to the median firm wage in our samples. The key goal of the identification 
strategy is that the wages of firms below the threshold will experience a significant boost 
from the NMW introduction relative to the higher wage firms.  
The results of the difference-in-differences analysis are reported in Tables 5 to 8. In 
the upper panel of each table we verify for all samples that wages rise by more in the T=1 
                                               
20 Draca et al. (2010) use information from FAME, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) both to construct and validate their treatment group indicators. 
Specifically, they use within-establishment information from matched worker-establishment data in WERS to 
investigate the association between low pay incidence and average wages and to verify the effectiveness of their 
empirical strategy.  
21 For the results reported we identify as low-wage the firms with average remuneration of less than £12,000 
over the three years prior to the introduction of the NMW in April 1999. This allows the elimination of outliers 
and also the more consistent identification of genuinely low-wage firms.  
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firms as compared to the T=0 firms after the introduction of the NMW in 1999. As expected, 
we identify stronger wage effects for the treatment groups. Thus, potential effects on 
productivity of the treatment group firms can be attributed to the ‘bite’ of the NMW after its 
introduction. Our definition is further enhanced by the fact that the comparison group 
contains firms with average wages not exceeding £24,000. Firms with much higher average 
wages are likely to be quite different in terms of their characteristics and therefore subject to 
different unobservable trends compared to the treatment group. To further check the 
robustness of our results we also create counterfactuals which contain firms from industries 
where the NMW’s ‘bite’ is expected to be weak. We select the industries based on literature 
evidence and expert opinions from both manufacturing and service sectors to roughly 
approximate the composition of the aggregate low-paying LPC sectors. We expect that in the 
counterfactuals NMW effects on wages and productivity will be much less pronounced. The 
empirical findings confirm our expectations.  
The results for productivity effects (for the OP2 measure) of NMW introduction are 
reported in the second panels of Tables 5 to 8.
22
 Our findings with respect to the impact of 
NMW on productivity are quite consistent across LPC sectors. It appears that the firms in the 
treatment groups where the NMW ‘bite’ is stronger have experienced relative increases in 
productivity over the period 1999 - 2009. The effects are statistically significant in all LPC 
sectors except for hairdressing, leisure and agriculture. When considering productivity effects 
by firm size groups, the largest relative increases in productivity are observed for large firms 
in the aggregate (all sectors) sample and in all service sectors. In the manufacturing sectors 
the relative productivity increases are largest for medium-size firms.  
In the third (bottom) panel of Tables 5 to 8 we also report results for the capital-labour 
(K/L) ratio. Changes in the K/L ratio may reflect technology adjustments in firms as a result 
                                               
22 The Appendix, Table A2 to Table A5, contains results with labour productivity (LP) measures. The relative 
increases in productivity resulting from NMW introduction are very similar to the ones reported for the OP2 
measure in the main text.  
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of the NMW over the ten-year period since its introduction. Such adjustments can be seen as 
long-term effects of the NMW and a potential source of productivity changes. It seems that in 
some of the LPC sectors, such as hospitality and social care, productivity improvements 
resulting from NMW introduction are indeed driven by substitution of labour for capital to a 
large degree compared with other LPC, mostly manufacturing, sectors. For the aggregate (all 
sectors) and services samples there is statistical evidence for substitution of labour for capital 
in the low-paying sectors while in the counterfactual samples such evidence does not occur. 
An alternative explanation to this long-run adjustment mechanism could be firm exit. In 
Table 4 we report exit rates by LPC sector for 1998 and 2008, before and ten years after the 
introduction of the NMW. It seems that in sectors with relative productivity gains where the 
labour-for-capital substitution is weaker, the exit rates are higher in 2008. This observation 
seems to support the argument that in the long-run less productive firms may exit under the 
pressure of increasing costs due to the introduction of the NMW.  
 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
Overall, our analyses show an improvement in total factor productivity in low-paying sectors 
as a result of the introduction of the NMW. Our analyses also reveal evidence of substantial 
heterogeneity across and within sectors.  This also applies across firm size groups, as effects 
are particularly marked in larger firms while the small-firm group shows the least 
improvement in productivity. To the best of our knowledge, our results provide the first 
significant empirical support for the long-standing theoretical argument in favour of a 
national minimum wage initially and tentatively advanced by the Webbs in the late 
Nineteenth Century (Webb and Webb, 1897). Their argument was first based on the wider 
social costs of not having effective minimum wages but later came to include increased 
productivity as firms sought to compensate for higher wage costs (Webb, 1912).   
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Documenting the phenomenon and providing contemporary and robust empirical 
evidence brings us to the limits of the type of analysis conducted here. As Mayhew and Neely 
(2006) and Keep et al. (2006) argue, in-company processes leading to higher productivity 
remain a ‘black box’. This tends to suggest a need both for a further in-depth econometric 
study testing various models, and for detailed case study investigation. Thus, we can only 
offer tentative hypothetical explanations of our results based on our discussions in previous 
sections. We attempt this in two areas: market position and internal company changes 
contributing to productive processes.  
Greater productivity gains in larger firms suggest possible pass-through and long-run 
mark-up effects in firms with more monopoly power who can pass on increases to customers. 
Their higher public profile is associated with high levels of compliance with the NMW 
legislation compared with smaller firms which may maintain a strategy to ‘stay underground’, 
i.e. keep low levels of visibility to all regulatory agencies rather than to move up market and 
improve (Ram et al., 2007; Croucher and White, 2007). For the larger firms, ‘staying 
underground’ and seeking to avoid full compliance with NMW requirements is not a viable 
option. Thus, large firms are likely to experience large increases in labour costs compared 
with small firms.  
The pass-through argument is also supported by our cross-sectoral evidence. Less 
competitive and mostly domestically-traded sectors such as social care show greater relative 
increases in productivity. Social care is a very varied sector that includes considerable social 
work, childcare and welfare segments as well as the residential home segment. Thus, much of 
it escapes the price-capping common in the latter segment (Machin and Manning, 2004). 
Even if it is impossible because of price-capping to pass costs on, a context of rising demand 
may provide incentives to improve productivity. Further, there is evidence in the social care 
sector of labour-for-capital substitution in the ten year period. Hairdressing on the other hand 
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does not seem to have been able to pass on labour cost increases or to substitute labour for 
capital. Furthermore, the industry has a long history of the problematic application of 
minimum rates of pay, suggesting that a non-compliance strategy appears a viable option for 
adaptation in the industry’s context (Druker et al., 2002; White and Croucher, 2007). Druker 
et al. (2002) show that hairdressing employers prefer to maintain a ‘steady state’, limiting 
innovation and maintaining prices. Thus, pay increases cannot be passed on and innovation is 
ruled out, closing off both of the obvious options.   
Internal firm reorganisation, besides long-run technology adjustments through labour-
for-capital substitutions, also seems likely to be relevant. Larger firms may have more 
capacity to reorganise productive processes simply because there is more labour available, 
making solutions such as increased use of functional and time flexibility more possible. They 
may be more able to develop adaptive strategies because of more articulated management 
structures and more sophisticated or ‘progressive’ Human Resource Management (Delaney 
and Huselid, 1996) and operations management practices. On the other hand, weak adoption 
of efficient operations management is characteristic of small British firms and especially 
‘micro’ and family firms employing fewer than twenty workers. They tend to be 
characterised by fragmented practices that are reactive to the environment (Cagliano et al., 
2001). Many of the smaller companies, for example individual nursing homes, are among the 
type of employers identified as likely to be ‘black hole’ organisations in terms of their HRM 
and employment relations (Guest and Conway, 1999). They are unlikely to have a strategic 
approach to HRM and this may reduce their capacity to introduce and manage functional and 
time flexibility and hence productivity (Friedrich et al., 1998). Larger firms are more likely to 
adopt what Rainbird et al. (2009), reporting on the social care sector, called ‘pro-active’ 
rather than the ‘reactive’ approach also found in the industry whereby companies simply 
react to regulatory pressure. Adam-Smith et al. (2003) reached a similar conclusion in the 
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hospitality industry: there was no evidence for a regulatory ‘shock’ to management practices 
after the introduction of the NMW, but rather a reinforcement of existing hierarchies and 
ways of working. This is consistent with the LPC 2008 survey of employers which showed 
that in hospitality, employers were most likely simply to reduce the numbers employed as a 
reaction to an increase in the NMW. More sophisticated adaptive responses were not 
perceived as viable. 
Thus, notwithstanding our speculation on its causes, we provide significant evidence 
that the introduction of NMW led to increases in productivity in all low-paying sectors and 
the increases are more marked in larger firms. There is also significant evidence of 
heterogeneity in responses across the low-paying sectors. Formulating specific policies to 
improve productivity through the NMW would require further research into the mechanisms 
of productivity improvement on a sector-by-sector basis.  
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Table 1  Characteristics of low paying sectors, 2010 
Industry Growth since 1998  Proportion of workers 
paid NMW 
Number of employees Results of NMW 
Retail Continuous growth 
until the start of the 
recession 
6.8% 3.2M The ACS reported that differentials continued to be 
squeezed as a result of increases to the NMW.   
Hospitality and 
Leisure, Travel and 
Sport 
A substantial fall 18.1% in Hospitality 
6.2% in Leisure, 
Travel and Sport 
1.09M in Hospitality 
648,000 in Leisure, 
Travel and Sport 
The ALMR said that 82 per cent of members had to 
let staff go because of increases in the MW. 
Social care Continuous growth 5% 1.2M Care providers told LPC the squeeze they faced 
resulting from the level of fees paid by public bodies 
that purchase care services.  
Childcare The Government 
continues to increase 
the provision of 
childcare 
4.8% 373,000 The White Horse Child Care Ltd. said that increases 
in the NMW had led to increases in the fees charged 
to parents, which had reduced the size of the market 
and excluded many of the parents that most needed 
high quality childcare. 
Cleaning and Security Continuous growth  
 
21.8% in the cleaning 
sector 
472,000 in Cleaning 
sector; 
178,000 in the Security 
sector 
CSSA reported that clients might accept increases of 
the MW; however, often shorten hours of contract or 
lower specification. 
Hairdressing  10.3%  The NHF stated any compulsory pressure to increase 
costs would inevitably result in continued job losses.  
 
Agriculture Falling employment 
and income 
2.8% 242,000 The NFU claimed that it was harder for the producers 
to compete with competitors in countries with lower 
MW.  
 
Textiles, Clothing and 
Food Processing 
(Manufacturing) 
Falling employment 
and declining output 
8.2% 82,000 in textiles and 
clothing;  
348,000 in food 
processing sector 
The FDF said that the industry is tending to pass any 
increase in wage costs to clients. 
Source: National Minimum Wage, Chapter 3, p.p. 54-77, Low Pay Commission Report 2010.  
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Table 2  NMW and tenth-fiftieth percentiles log(wage) differentials by LPC sectors 
 
Year 
 
NMW, 
£ 
Tenth-fiftieth percentile log(wage) differentials 
Social 
care 
Retail Hospitali
ty 
Cleaning Security Hairdres
sing 
Textiles Agricult
ure 
Food 
process 
Leisure Counter 
M 
Counter 
S 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
1996 - -0.76 -0.80 -0.88 -1.01 -0.86 -0.67 -0.90 -1.04 -0.75 -1.02 -0.36 -0.88 
1997 - -0.78 -0.78 -0.84 -1.02 -0.85 -0.66 -0.90 -1.02 -0.76 -1.00 -0.36 -0.92 
1998 - -0.76 -0.77 -0.82 -1.06 -0.84 -0.58 -0.82 -0.96 -0.75 -1.02 -0.42 -0.92 
1999 3.90 -0.77 -0.75 -0.75 -1.02 -1.07 -0.59 -0.78 -0.90 -0.67 -0.96 -0.41 -0.94 
2000 3.97 -0.75 -0.72 -0.71 -0.96 -0.95 -0.52 -0.70 -0.91 -0.58 -0.92 -0.43 -0.95 
2001 4.35 -0.68 -0.64 -0.62 -0.84 -0.74 -0.56 -0.63 -0.90 -0.45 -0.92 -0.45 -0.96 
2002 4.40 -0.68 -0.60 -0.57 -0.79 -0.59 -0.54 -0.59 -0.88 -0.38 -0.89 -0.42 -0.95 
2003 4.65 -0.67 -0.60 -0.61 -0.77 -0.70 -0.44 -0.52 -0.87 -0.37 -0.88 -0.48 -0.94 
2004 4.95 -0.60 -0.61 -0.58 -0.82 -0.70 -0.48 -0.50 -0.87 -0.36 -0.89 -0.46 -0.98 
2005 5.05 -0.62 -0.62 -0.60 -0.87 -0.71 -0.54 -0.51 -0.92 -0.40 -0.93 -0.45 -0.97 
2006 5.23 -0.64 -0.63 -0.58 -0.86 -0.80 -0.58 -0.51 -0.91 -0.44 -0.92 -0.42 -0.98 
2007 5.27 -0.61 -0.65 -0.58 -0.85 -0.84 -0.51 -0.55 -0.85 -0.40 -0.92 -0.45 -1.00 
2008 5.28 -0.53 -0.64 -0.61 -0.86 -0.74 -0.51 -0.60 -0.77 -0.37 -0.89 -0.45 -1.00 
2009 5.23 -0.58 -0.64 -0.62 -0.93 -0.76 -0.58 -0.68 -0.82 -0.40 -0.87 -0.52 -0.95 
Note: Counter M comprises the manufacturing industries counterfactual and Counter S - service industries one.  
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Table 3  Summary statistics by LPC sector, 1996-2009 
Variables Social 
care 
Retail Hospitali
ty 
Cleaning Security Hair-
dressing 
Textiles Agricult
ure 
Food 
process 
Leisure Counter M Counter S 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Value added, 
th£ 
1615 
(7284) 
13045 
(162869) 
4449 
(24991) 
4971 
(36823) 
16011 
(191088) 
1255 
(4833) 
6052 
(30598) 
1097 
(3957) 
18836 
(121504) 
4583 
(25568) 
52946 
(491646) 
13256 
(222233) 
Fixed assets, 
th£ 
4698 
(39576) 
17303 
(278458) 
17114 
(158836) 
11108 
(117243) 
15711 
(172632) 
719 
(3253) 
4597 
(31690) 
2547 
(10899) 
26542 
(222056) 
8398 
(71295) 
140916 
(1729177) 
39147 
(1302974) 
Investment, 
th£ 
1289 
(18887) 
3279 
(56147) 
2761 
(37952) 
2734 
(33480) 
3319 
(44148) 
182 
(1074) 
965 
(9980) 
450 
(2489) 
4947 
(53139) 
2057 
(24281) 
27284 
(487335) 
9038 
(173691) 
Number of 
employees 
174 
(728) 
470 
(5148) 
336 
(5030) 
1305 
(6947) 
2872 
(34567) 
80 
(360) 
328 
(2339) 
55 
(335) 
557 
(3057) 
121 
(694) 
659 
(3835) 
156 
(1483) 
Age, years 17 
(17) 
24 
(20) 
19 
(19) 
22 
(21) 
11 
(8) 
11 
(10) 
31 
(26) 
30 
(19) 
26 
(23) 
24 
(24) 
27 
(24) 
14 
(13) 
Exporters 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.06 0.57 0.11 0.40 0.14 0.50 0.19 
Exits 1998 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Exits 2008 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Urban 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.93 0.96 0.90 0.92 0.44 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.93 
Rural less 
sparse 
0.09 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.52 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.07 
Rural sparse 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Number of 
observations 
5156 70668 22019 3491 935 1864 8232 13408 10169 24665 15325 30681 
Note: Unweighted means and standard deviations (s.d.) are reported. Counter M comprises the manufacturing industries counterfactual and Counter S - service industries one.   
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Table 4  Production function OP2 and OP1 coefficients and productivity estimates by LPC sector, 1996-2009 
Coefficients Social 
care 
Retail Hospitalit
y 
Cleaning Security Hair-
dressing 
Textiles Agricultu
re 
Food 
process 
Leisure Counter 
M 
Counter 
S 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
OP2 coefficients 
Labour 0.94 
(0.08) 
0.70 
(0.02) 
0.54 
(0.02) 
0.50 
(0.02) 
0.50 
(0.08) 
0.60 
(0.06) 
0.56 
(0.04) 
0.72 
(0.03) 
0.59 
(0.05) 
0.96 
(0.04) 
0.72 
(0.05) 
0.75 
(0.05) 
Capital 0.06 
(0.03) 
0.08 
(0.01) 
0.18 
(0.01) 
0.16 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.04) 
0.21 
(0.03) 
0.28 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.02) 
0.26 
(0.02) 
0.07 
(0.02) 
0.20 
(0.03) 
0.19 
(0.02) 
Age 0.07 
(0.02) 
0.25 
(0.03) 
0.33 
(0.13) 
0.22 
(0.05) 
0.38 
(0.19) 
0.47 
(0.16) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.29 
(0.07) 
0.56 
(0.19) 
0.14 
(0.08) 
0.30 
(0.11) 
Adj R
2 
0.90 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.92 0.97 0.92 0.96 0.92 
Aggregate OP2 1.50 
(0.37) 
3.49 
(0.47) 
3.12 
(1.32) 
2.83 
(0.46) 
4.19 
(0.59) 
3.14 
(0.42) 
2.98 
(0.15) 
2.19 
(0.39) 
3.13 
(0.26) 
2.17 
(0.32) 
3.00 
(0.28) 
3.34 
(0.19) 
OP1 coefficients 
Labour 0.88 
(0.04) 
0.66 
(0.02) 
0.56 
(0.03) 
0.54 
(0.05) 
0.58 
(0.07) 
0.64 
(0.06) 
0.50 
(0.04) 
0.65 
(0.04) 
0.52 
(0.03) 
0.94 
(0.04) 
0.65 
(0.07) 
0.73 
(0.04) 
Capital 0.09 
(0.02) 
0.10 
(0.01) 
0.14 
(0.01) 
0.20 
(0.03) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
0.22 
(0.03) 
0.30 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.03) 
0.30 
(0.02) 
0.09 
(0.01) 
0.23 
(0.04) 
0.23 
(0.02) 
Age 0.20 
(0.08) 
0.19 
(0.07) 
0.27 
(0.13) 
0.25 
(0.15) 
0.18 
(0.16) 
0.23 
(0.14) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.18 
(0.10) 
0.18 
(0.07) 
0.50 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
Adj R
2
 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.91 0.97 0.92 0.95 0.92 
Aggregate OP1 1.96 
(0.29) 
4.08 
(1.32) 
2,83 
(1.42) 
2.01 
(0.67) 
3.60 
(0.41) 
2.20 
(0.50) 
3.17 
(0.40) 
2.42 
(0.34) 
2.78 
(0.27) 
2.12 
(0.33) 
3.33 
(0.52) 
3.14 
(0.47) 
Aggregate LP 1.60 
(0.37) 
3.12 
(1.17) 
2.32 
(1.28) 
1.98 
(1.02) 
2.96 
(0.74) 
2.24 
(0.64) 
2.81 
(0.23) 
2.38 
(0.60) 
3.12 
(0.17) 
2.25 
(0.19) 
3.12 
(0.31) 
3.08 
(0.73) 
Note: The reported coefficients and aggregate productivity are weighted averages, using number of employees as weight, from 4-digit industry regressions on firm level data. 
The R2 reported are from the last stage of the estimation algorithm. Standard errors (standard deviations for productivity) are reported in parentheses. Counter M comprises 
the manufacturing industries counterfactual and Counter S - service industries one.   
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Figure 1  Summary of the results from the OP2 model for aggregate LPC sectors and counterfactual (A) 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.94 (t 8.13)  
 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.16 (t 0.58)  
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Figure 2  Summary of the results from the OP2 model for aggregate LPC manufacturing sectors and counterfactual (M) 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.49 (t 3.47)  
 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.30 (t 1.17)  
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Figure 3  Summary of the results from the OP2 model for aggregate LPC service sectors and counterfactual (S) 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 1.03 (t 8.96)  
 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.01 (t 0.12)  
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Table 5  Difference-in-differences analysis of wages, OP2, and K/L for the aggregate LPC sectors and counterfactual (A) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Aggregate  
(T) ln(w) 
1.970 
(0.008) 
2.106 
(0.009) 
+0.136 
(0.010) 
1.916 
(0.011) 
2.023 
(0.012) 
+0.107 
(0.008) 
2.089 
(0.014) 
2.267 
(0.013) 
+0.178 
(0.014) 
1.980 
(0.025) 
2.140 
(0.024) 
+0.161 
(0.012) 
Aggregate  
(C) ln(w) 
2.802 
(0.002) 
2.857 
(0.004) 
+0.055 
(0.004) 
+0.081*** 
(0.007) 
2.804 
(0.003) 
2.821 
(0.006) 
+0.017 
(0.005) 
+0.090*** 
(0.009) 
2.804 
(0.004) 
2.882 
(0.007) 
+0.078 
(0.006) 
+0.100*** 
(0.013) 
2.790 
(0.006) 
2.875 
(0.009) 
+0.085 
(0.007) 
+0.076*** 
(0.013) 
Aggregate  
(T) OP2 
2.834 
(0.015) 
2.846 
(0.016) 
+0.012 
(0.008) 
2.676 
(0.018) 
2.659 
(0.019) 
-0.017 
(0.009) 
2.936 
(0.030) 
2.968 
(0.031) 
+0.032 
(0.015) 
3.371 
(0.043) 
3.486 
(0.042) 
+0.116 
(0.020) 
Aggregate  
(C) OP2 
3.168 
(0.012) 
3.136 
(0.012) 
-0.033 
(0.006) 
+0.044*** 
(0.010) 
3.113 
(0.015) 
3.069 
(0.016) 
-0.044 
(0.008) 
+0.027*** 
(0.012) 
3.158 
(0.021) 
3.133 
(0.021) 
-0.025 
(0.009) 
+0.057*** 
(0.017) 
3.418 
(0.042) 
3.421 
(0.042) 
+0.003 
(0.019) 
+0.113*** 
(0.027) 
Aggregate  
(T) K/L 
1.929 
(0.024) 
2.222 
(0.025) 
+0.293 
(0.012) 
1.998 
(0.030) 
2.246 
(0.032) 
+0.249 
(0.016) 
1.937 
(0.042) 
2.297 
(0.045) 
+0.360 
(0.025) 
1.533 
(0.072) 
1.804 
(0.074) 
+0.271 
(0.030) 
Aggregate  
(C) K/L 
2.354 
(0.018) 
2.615 
(0.018) 
+0.261 
(0.010) 
+0.032** 
(0.016) 
2.240 
(0.025) 
2.483 
(0.027) 
+0.244 
(0.014) 
+0.005 
(0.021) 
2.447 
(0.028) 
2.744 
(0.027) 
+0.297 
(0.016) 
+0.063** 
(0.029) 
2.570 
(0.048) 
2.800 
(0.047) 
+0.230 
(0.028) 
+0.041 
(0.042) 
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Table 5  Continued 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Counterfactual 
A (T) ln(w) 
2.336 
(0.083) 
2.290 
(0.069) 
-0.047 
(0.038) 
2.295 
(0.094) 
2.222 
(0.080) 
-0.073 
(0.033) 
2.637 
(0.210) 
2.624 
(0.161) 
-0.013 
(0.106) 
2.478 
(0.229) 
2.531 
(0.128) 
+0.053 
(0.150) 
Counterfactual 
A (C) ln(w) 
3.051 
(0.028) 
2.981 
(0.00) 
-0.070 
(0.018) 
+0.023 
(0.046) 
3.102 
(0.041) 
3.015 
(0.031) 
-0.087 
(0.019) 
+0.014 
(0.040) 
3.032 
(0.037) 
2.966 
(0.031) 
-0.066 
(0.018) 
+0.053 
(0.083) 
2.932 
(0.071) 
2.902 
(0.059) 
-0.029 
(0.037) 
+0.082 
(0.150) 
Counterfactual 
A (T) OP2 
2.543 
(0.074) 
2.551 
(0.076) 
+0.007 
(0.062) 
2.546 
(0.072) 
2.516 
(0.075) 
-0.029 
(0.062) 
2.654 
(0.299) 
2.769 
(0.266) 
+0.115 
(0.177) 
2.715 
(0.924) 
3.021 
(0.375) 
+0.306 
(0.661) 
Counterfactual 
A (C) OP2 
2.849 
(0.034) 
2.872 
(0.033) 
+0.023 
(0.024) 
-0.016 
(0.058) 
2.798 
(0.041) 
2.805 
(0.040) 
+0.007 
(0.032) 
-0.036 
(0.065) 
2.802 
(0.066) 
2.860 
(0.060) 
+0.058 
(0.055) 
+0.057 
(0.202) 
3.139 
(0.104) 
3.093 
(0.122) 
-0.046 
(0.094) 
+0.352 
(0.414) 
Counterfactual 
A (T) K/L 
1.430 
(0.111) 
1.842 
(0.119) 
+0.412 
(0.057) 
1.285 
(0.114) 
1.703 
(0.125) 
+0.418 
(0.059) 
2.546 
(0.495) 
2.724 
(0.473) 
+0.115 
(0.177) 
2.397 
(0.369) 
3.333 
(0.442) 
+0.936 
(0.225) 
Counterfactual 
A (C) K/L 
1.646 
(0.042) 
2.102 
(0.044) 
+0.456 
(0.026) 
-0.044 
(0.061) 
1.176 
(0.054) 
1.651 
(0.059) 
+0.475 
(0.033) 
-0.057 
(0.065) 
2.054 
(0.073) 
2.398 
(0.073) 
+0.343 
(0.044) 
-0.166 
(0.180) 
2.599 
(0.095) 
2.972 
(0.101) 
+0.373 
(0.070) 
+0.563** 
(0.291) 
Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages, productivity or K/L ratio after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1% or 
better; ** 5% or better; * 10% or better. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. OP2 is productivity measure estimated by the Olley-Pakes 
modified algorithm based on a 2
nd
 order Markov process. Counterfactual is an aggregate of manufacturing (M) and services (S) counterfactuals.  
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Table 6  Difference-in-differences analysis of wages, OP2, and K/L for the manufacturing LPC sectors and counterfactual (M) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Manufacturing 
(T) ln(w) 
1.953 
(0.020) 
2.099 
(0.022) 
+0.146 
(0.014) 
1.848 
(0.026) 
1.928 
(0.027) 
+0.080 
(0.016) 
2.210 
(0.023) 
2.460 
(0.025) 
+0.250 
(0.028) 
2.102 
(0.064) 
2.270 
(0.068) 
+0.168 
(0.020) 
Manufacturing 
(C) ln(w) 
2.786 
(0.005) 
2.894 
(0.008) 
+0.108 
(0.007) 
+0.039** 
(0.014) 
2.796 
(0.008) 
2.843 
(0.014) 
+0.046 
(0.012) 
+0.034** 
(0.020) 
2.783 
(0.008) 
2.901 
(0.011) 
+0.118 
(0.009) 
+0.112*** 
(0.022) 
2.782 
(0.010) 
2.934 
(0.015) 
+0.152 
(0.010) 
+0.016 
(0.021) 
Manufacturing 
(T) OP2 
2.284 
(0.032) 
2.306 
(0.034) 
+0.022 
(0.019) 
2.124 
(0.044) 
2.116 
(0.046) 
-0.008 
(0.026) 
2.530 
(0.046) 
2.586 
(0.052) 
+0.056 
(0.033) 
2.796 
(0.069) 
2.857 
(0.077) 
+0.061 
(0.039) 
Manufacturing 
(C) OP2 
2.927 
(0.023) 
2.906 
(0.024) 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
+0.043*** 
(0.024) 
2.790 
(0.042) 
2.742 
(0.044) 
-0.048 
(0.024) 
+0.040 
(0.035) 
2.996 
(0.029) 
2.943 
(0.030) 
-0.053 
(0.019) 
+0.109*** 
(0.037) 
3.115 
(0.041) 
3.165 
(0.046) 
+0.050 
(0.030) 
+0.011 
(0.053) 
Manufacturing 
(T) K/L 
2.454 
(0.048) 
2.653 
(0.053) 
+0.199 
(0.026) 
2.767 
(0.064) 
2.931 
(0.071) 
+0.164 
(0.031) 
1.849 
(0.065) 
2.117 
(0.078) 
+0.268 
(0.049) 
1.774 
(0.077) 
1.981 
(0.085) 
+0.207 
(0.054) 
Manufacturing 
(C) K/L 
2.829 
(0.032) 
3.037 
(0.033) 
+0.208 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.030) 
3.102 
(0.059) 
3.260 
(0.062) 
+0.158 
(0.026) 
+0.006 
(0.041) 
2.541 
(0.045) 
2.827 
(0.043) 
+0.286 
(0.026) 
-0.018 
(0.052) 
2.805 
(0.047) 
2.959 
(0.055) 
+0.154 
(0.037) 
+0.053 
(0.066) 
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Table 6  Continued 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Counterfactual 
M (T) ln(w) 
2.269 
(0.171) 
2.266 
(0.156) 
-0.003 
(0.080) 
2.157 
(0.248) 
2.119 
(0.234) 
-0.037 
(0.076) 
2.478 
(0.137) 
2.515 
(0.134) 
+0.037 
(0.051) 
2.407 
(0.422) 
2.618 
(0.066) 
+0.211 
(0.371) 
Counterfactual 
M (C) ln(w) 
2.969 
(0.036) 
2.930 
(0.026) 
-0.039 
(0.022) 
+0.036 
(0.082) 
3.070 
(0.077) 
2.997 
(0.058) 
-0.073 
(0.036) 
+0.035 
(0.088) 
2.965 
(0.037) 
2.968 
(0.028) 
+0.003 
(0.020) 
+0.034 
(0.102) 
2.861 
(0.082) 
2.897 
(0.072) 
+0.036 
(0.032) 
+0.175 
(0.186) 
Counterfactual 
M (T) OP2 
2.695 
(0.124) 
2.667 
(0.139) 
-0.028 
(0.072) 
2.618 
(0.129) 
2.640 
(0.139) 
+0.022 
(0.084) 
2.952 
(0.461) 
2.843 
(0.585) 
-0.109 
(0.183) 
3.370 
(0.518) 
3.268 
(0.443) 
-0.102 
(0.249) 
Counterfactual 
M (C) OP2 
2.953 
(0.038) 
2.974 
(0.040) 
+0.021 
(0.022) 
-0.049 
(0.066) 
2.857 
(0.054) 
2.881 
(0.056) 
+0.024 
(0.032) 
-0.002 
(0.075) 
2.890 
(0.052) 
2.902 
(0.057) 
+0.012 
(0.028) 
-0.121 
(0.137) 
3.218 
(0.108) 
3.199 
(0.123) 
-0.019 
(0.082) 
-0.083 
(0.474) 
Counterfactual 
M (T) K/L 
1.962 
(0.179) 
2.198 
(0.178) 
+0.236 
(0.094) 
2.006 
(0.204) 
2.127 
(0.207) 
+0.122 
(0.096) 
1.435 
(0.457) 
2.048 
(0.314) 
+0.612 
(0.293) 
2.346 
(0.132) 
3.250 
(0.323) 
+0.904 
(0.385) 
Counterfactual 
M (C) K/L 
2.169 
(0.046) 
2.418 
(0.049) 
+0.249 
(0.037) 
-0.013 
(0.107) 
1.837 
(0.073) 
2.043 
(0.084) 
+0.206 
(0.054) 
-0.084 
(0.114) 
2.202 
(0.067) 
2.419 
(0.066) 
+0.218 
(0.046) 
+0.394** 
(0.228) 
2.791 
(0.079) 
3.057 
(0.078) 
+0.266 
(0.077) 
+0.638* 
(0.445) 
Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages, productivity or K/L ratio after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1% or 
better; ** 5% or better; * 10% or better. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. OP2 is productivity measure estimated by the Olley-Pakes 
modified algorithm based on a 2
nd
 order Markov process.  
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Table 7  Difference-in-differences analysis of wages, OP2, and K/L for the service LPC sectors and counterfactual (S) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Services  
(T) ln(w) 
1.972 
(0.009) 
2.116 
(0.09) 
+0.144 
(0.008) 
1.933 
(0.013) 
2.050 
(0.012) 
+0.117 
(0.010) 
2.055 
(0.017) 
2.220 
(0.015) 
+0.165 
(0.016) 
1.955 
(0.027) 
2.112 
(0.025) 
+0.157 
(0.014) 
Services  
(C) ln(w) 
 
2.806 
(0.003) 
2.842 
(0.005) 
+0.036 
(0.004) 
+0.108*** 
(0.008) 
2.806 
(0.004) 
2.814 
(0.006) 
+0.008 
(0.005) 
+0.109*** 
(0.011) 
2.813 
(0.005) 
2.867 
(0.008) 
+0.054 
(0.007) 
+0.110*** 
(0.016) 
2.792 
(0.008) 
2.843 
(0.011) 
+0.050 
(0.008) 
+0.107*** 
(0.016) 
Services  
(T) OP2 
2.984 
(0.017) 
2.993 
(0.018) 
+0.009 
(0.008) 
2.823 
(0.020) 
2.797 
(0.020) 
-0.026 
(0.010) 
3.027 
(0.037) 
3.052 
(0.037) 
+0.025 
(0.017) 
3.486 
(0.048) 
3.611 
(0.046) 
+0.125 
(0.022) 
Services  
(C) OP2 
3.239 
(0.013) 
3.200 
(0.014) 
-0.039 
(0.007) 
+0.047*** 
(0.010) 
3.174 
(0.016) 
3.134 
(0.017) 
-0.040 
(0.009) 
+0.014 
(0.013) 
3.216 
(0.028) 
3.198 
(0.027) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
+0.043** 
(0.021) 
3.586 
(0.059) 
3.560 
(0.059) 
-0.026 
(0.023) 
+0.151*** 
(0.032) 
Services  
(T) K/L 
1.791 
(0.027) 
2.110 
(0.028) 
+0.319 
(0.014) 
1.790 
(0.033) 
2.063 
(0.035) 
+0.273 
(0.018) 
1.954 
(0.050) 
2.351 
(0.052) 
+0.397 
(0.027) 
1.486 
(0.085) 
1.771 
(0.088) 
+0.285 
(0.034) 
Services  
(C) K/L 
2.207 
(0.020) 
2.481 
(0.022) 
+0.274 
(0.012) 
+0.046*** 
(0.019) 
2.049 
(0.027) 
2.313 
(0.029) 
+0.264 
(0.016) 
+0.009 
(0.024) 
2.407 
(0.035) 
2.714 
(0.034) 
+0.306 
(0.021) 
+0.091*** 
(0.034) 
2.446 
(0.067) 
2.725 
(0.064) 
+0.279 
(0.038) 
+0.006 
(0.051) 
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Table 7  Continued 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Counterfactual 
S (T) ln(w) 
2.365 
(0.094) 
2.286 
(0.077) 
-0.079 
(0.043) 
2.326 
(0.102) 
2.252 
(0.086) 
-0.073 
(0.036) 
2.701 
(0.369) 
2.657 
(0.279) 
-0.044 
(0.186) 
2.444 
(0.328) 
2.369 
(0.289) 
-0.076 
(0.157) 
Counterfactual 
S (C) ln(w) 
3.150 
(0.041) 
2.993 
(0.028) 
-0.157 
(0.024) 
+0.078 
(0.054) 
3.110 
(0.049) 
3.011 
(0.037) 
-0.099 
(0.022) 
+0.026 
(0.046) 
3.150 
(0.086) 
2.998 
(0.076) 
-0.152 
(0.032) 
+0.108 
(0.123) 
3.108 
(0.144) 
2.903 
(0.109) 
-0.205 
(0.101) 
+0.129 
(0.291) 
Counterfactual 
S (T) OP2 
2.522 
(0.092) 
2.531 
(0.090) 
+0.009 
(0.079) 
2.525 
(0.086) 
2.478 
(0.088) 
-0.047 
(0.078) 
2.703 
(0.428) 
3.009 
(0.308) 
+0.306 
(0.233) 
2.142 
(0.602) 
2.098 
(0.574) 
-0.044 
(0.080) 
Counterfactual 
S (C) OP2 
2.743 
(0.054) 
2.773 
(0.050) 
+0.030 
(0.039) 
-0.021 
(0.082) 
2.775 
(0.054) 
2.775 
(0.056) 
-0.000 
(0.044) 
-0.047 
(0.086) 
2.681 
(0.157) 
2.786 
(0.137) 
+0.105 
(0.143) 
+0.200 
(0.384) 
2.956 
(0.216) 
2.848 
(0.271) 
-0.108 
(0.219) 
+0.064 
(0.630) 
Counterfactual 
S (T) K/L 
1.237 
(0.134) 
1.741 
(0.149) 
+0.503 
(0.072) 
1.075 
(0.132) 
1.592 
(0.150) 
+0.517 
(0.071) 
2.849 
(0.727) 
2.832 
(0.722) 
-0.017 
(0.450) 
2.395 
(0.562) 
3.240 
(0.686) 
+0.845 
(0.349) 
Counterfactual 
S (C) K/L 
1.178 
(0.064) 
1.812 
(0.068) 
+0.634 
(0.037) 
-0.131** 
(0.076) 
0.876 
(0.067) 
1.449 
(0.074) 
+0.572 
(0.040) 
-0.055 
(0.078) 
1.737 
(0.158) 
2.247 
(0.165) 
+0.510 
(0.087) 
-0.527** 
(0.284) 
2.222 
(0.236) 
2.771 
(0.263) 
+0.549 
(0.142) 
+0.296 
(0.425) 
Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages, productivity or K/L ratio after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1% or 
better; ** 5% or better; * 10% or better. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. OP2 is productivity measure estimated by the Olley-Pakes 
modified algorithm based on a 2
nd
 order Markov process.  
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Table 8  Difference-in-differences analysis of wages, OP2, and K/L by LPC sectors and firm size bands 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Retail  
(T) ln(w) 
2.008 
(0.012) 
2.136 
(0.011) 
+0.128 
(0.010) 
1.196 
(0.016) 
2.072 
(0.015) 
+0.108 
(0.013) 
2.089 
(0.028) 
2.275 
(0.021) 
+0.186 
(0.025) 
2.117 
(0.019) 
2.242 
(0.018) 
+0.125 
(0.020) 
Retail  
(C) ln(w) 
2.813 
(0.003) 
2.865 
(0.005) 
+0.052 
(0.004) 
+0.079*** 
(0.005) 
2.808 
(0.004) 
2.830 
(0.007) 
+0.021 
(0.006) 
+0.087*** 
(0.012) 
2.831 
(0.006) 
2.910 
(0.008) 
+0.079 
(0.006) 
+0.107*** 
(0.018) 
2.805 
(0.009) 
2.882 
(0.014) 
+0.076 
(0.009) 
+0.048*** 
(0.020) 
Retail  
(T) OP2 
3.223 
(0.019) 
3.247 
(0.020) 
+0.024 
(0.009) 
2.999 
(0.020) 
2.999 
(0.021) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
3.438 
(0.040) 
3.485 
(0.038) 
+0.047 
(0.018) 
4.110 
(0.056) 
4.211 
(0.057) 
+0.100 
(0.025) 
Retail  
(C) OP2 
3.320 
(0.015) 
3.312 
(0.015) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
+0.031*** 
(0.010) 
3.258 
(0.017) 
3.244 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.007) 
+0.013 
(0.012) 
3.287 
(0.029) 
3.290 
(0.028) 
+0.004 
(0.009) 
+0.043*** 
(0.019) 
3.796 
(0.066) 
3.824 
(0.066) 
+0.028 
(0.020) 
+0.073*** 
(0.032) 
Retail  
(T) K/L 
1.766 
(0.032) 
1.954 
(0.034) 
+0.188 
(0.018) 
1.658 
(0.041) 
1.817 
(0.044) 
+0.159 
(0.022) 
1.887 
(0.059) 
2.132 
(0.067) 
+0.245 
(0.040) 
2.256 
(0.068) 
2.454 
(0.077) 
+0.198 
(0.045) 
Retail  
(C) K/L 
2.208 
(0.021) 
2.369 
(0.023) 
+0.160 
(0.014) 
+0.028 
(0.023) 
2.050 
(0.029) 
2.207 
(0.032) 
+0.157 
(0.018) 
+0.002 
(0.028) 
2.358 
(0.034) 
2.551 
(0.034) 
+0.192 
(0.024) 
+0.053 
(0.045) 
2.563 
(0.062) 
2.727 
(0.055) 
+0.164 
(0.047) 
+0.034 
(0.067) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Hospitality  
(T) ln(w) 
2.016 
(0.016) 
2.120 
(0.016) 
+0.104 
(0.013) 
1.939 
(0.026) 
2.024 
(0.028) 
+0.084 
(0.020) 
2.076 
(0.023) 
2.195 
(0.022) 
+0.119 
(0.023) 
2.046 
(0.033) 
2.190 
(0.037) 
+0.144 
(0.025) 
Hospitality  
(C) ln(w) 
2.749 
(0.008) 
2.742 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
+0.111*** 
(0.019) 
2.764 
(0.012) 
2.728 
(0.020) 
-0.035 
(0.016) 
+0.041*** 
(0.014) 
2.731 
(0.013) 
2.763 
(0.016) 
+0.031 
(0.013) 
+0.087*** 
(0.031) 
2.747 
(0.019) 
2.762 
(0.026) 
+0.015 
(0.018) 
+0.129*** 
(0.036) 
Hospitality  
(T) OP2 
3.263 
(0.025) 
3.283 
(0.025) 
+0.020 
(0.015) 
3.065 
(0.035) 
3.054 
(0.034) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
3.363 
(0.038) 
3.398 
(0.036) 
+0.035 
(0.024) 
3.611 
(0.084) 
3.658 
(0.090) 
+0.046 
(0.074) 
Hospitality  
(C) OP2 
3.745 
(0.032) 
3.697 
(0.033) 
-0.048 
(0.018) 
+0.069*** 
(0.024) 
3.619 
(0.043) 
3.577 
(0.044) 
-0.042 
(0.027) 
+0.031 
(0.031) 
3.838 
(0.043) 
3.787 
(0.042) 
-0.051 
(0.025) 
+0.087*** 
(0.036) 
3.871 
(0.137) 
3.715 
(0.158) 
-0.156 
(0.100) 
+0.203** 
(0.124) 
Hospitality  
(T) K/L 
2.457 
(0.050) 
2.760 
(0.050) 
+0.303 
(0.023) 
2.369 
(0.070) 
2.600 
(0.072) 
+0.231 
(0.032) 
2.629 
(0.077) 
3.013 
(0.074) 
+0.384 
(0.042) 
2.373 
(0.155) 
2.711 
(0.154) 
+0.337 
(0.053) 
Hospitality  
(C) K/L 
2.971 
(0.072) 
3.163 
(0.073) 
+0.192 
(0.033) 
+0.111*** 
(0.040) 
2.706 
(0.107) 
2.767 
(0.111) 
+0.061 
(0.057) 
+0.170*** 
(0.061) 
3.203 
(0.105) 
3.567 
(0.103) 
+0.363 
(0.041) 
+0.021 
(0.062) 
3.035 
(0.234) 
3.325 
(0.220) 
+0.291 
(0.084) 
+0.046 
(0.095) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Social care  
(T) ln(w) 
1.982 
(0.046) 
2.203 
(0.046) 
+0.221 
(0.036) 
1.922 
(0.061) 
2.134 
(0.066) 
+0.212 
(0.044) 
2.080 
(0.078) 
2.358 
(0.050) 
+0.278 
(0.088) 
   
Social care  
(C) ln(w) 
2.832 
(0.017) 
2.822 
(0.025) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
+0.231*** 
(0.046) 
2.831 
(0.022) 
2.816 
(0.035) 
-0.014 
(0.032) 
+0.227*** 
(0.058) 
2.815 
(0.032) 
2.848 
(0.043) 
+0.032 
(0.029) 
+0.246** 
(0.125) 
   
Social care  
(T) OP2 
1.392 
(0.110) 
1.345 
(0.110) 
-0.047 
(0.068) 
1.503 
(0.133) 
1.371 
(0.129) 
-0.131 
(0.075) 
1.170 
(0.260) 
1.219 
(0.278) 
+0.049 
(0.075) 
   
Social care  
(C) OP2 
1.740 
(0.158) 
1.541 
(0.164) 
-0.199 
(0.073) 
+0.152* 
(0.101) 
2.143 
(0.167) 
1.864 
(0.196) 
-0.279 
(0.101) 
+0.148 
(0.123) 
1.374 
(0.256) 
1.269 
(0.272) 
-0.105 
(0.062) 
+0.154* 
(0.114) 
   
Social care  
(T) K/L 
2.033 
(0.142) 
2.368 
(0.149) 
+0.336 
(0.054) 
2.146 
(0.177) 
2.478 
(0.186) 
+0.332 
(0.074) 
1.671 
(0.227) 
1.998 
(0.296) 
+0.327 
(0.095) 
   
Social care  
(C) K/L 
2.108 
(0.165) 
2.229 
(0.162) 
+0.122 
(0.067) 
+0.214*** 
(0.086) 
2.090 
(0.212) 
2.168 
(0.210) 
+0.078 
(0.089) 
+0.254*** 
(0.116) 
1.616 
(0.372) 
1.932 
(0.354) 
+0.317 
(0.131) 
+0.010 
(0.163) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Cleaning  
(T) ln(w) 
1.598 
(0.047) 
1.815 
(0.041) 
+0.217 
(0.050) 
1.840 
(0.128) 
1.933 
(0.146) 
+0.092 
(0.078) 
1.530 
(0.135) 
1.728 
(0.103) 
+0.119 
(0.127) 
1.560 
(0.053) 
1.792 
(0.050) 
+0.231 
(0.028) 
Cleaning  
(C) ln(w) 
2.792 
(0.022) 
2.731 
(0.039) 
-0.060 
(0.029) 
+0.277*** 
(0.056) 
2.781 
(0.038) 
2.662 
(0.078) 
-0.119 
(0.058) 
+0.211** 
(0.095) 
2.804 
(0.035) 
2.800 
(0.046) 
-0.004 
(0.037) 
+0.203*** 
(0.138) 
2.797 
(0.046) 
2.722 
(0.057) 
-0.075 
(0.055) 
+0.201*** 
(0.027) 
Cleaning  
(T) OP2 
2.790 
(0.048) 
2.900 
(0.054) 
+0.110 
(0.028) 
2.654 
(0.142) 
2.634 
(0.145) 
-0.020 
(0.073) 
2.508 
(0.079) 
2.542 
(0.106) 
+0.034 
(0.048) 
2.908 
(0.060) 
3.080 
(0.059) 
+0.173 
(0.033) 
Cleaning  
(C) OP2 
3.303 
(0.092) 
3.180 
(0.101) 
-0.123 
(0.040) 
+0.232*** 
(0.048) 
3.274 
(0.082) 
3.219 
(0.128) 
-0.056 
(0.074) 
+0.035 
(0.107) 
3.204 
(0.154) 
3.048 
(0.171) 
-0.157 
(0.080) 
+0.191*** 
(0.074) 
3.127 
(0.268) 
2.992 
(0.271) 
-0.135 
(0.109) 
+0.308** 
(0.107) 
Cleaning  
(T) K/L 
0.167 
(0.121) 
0.505 
(0.104) 
+0.338 
(0.063) 
0.436 
(0.341) 
0.968 
(0.360) 
+0.532 
(0.118) 
0.116 
(0.202) 
0.362 
(0.297) 
+0.246 
(0.136) 
0.346 
(0.098) 
0.622 
(0.100) 
+0.276 
(0.074) 
Cleaning  
(C) K/L 
1.048 
(0.131) 
1.686 
(0.142) 
+0.638 
(0.112) 
-0.300*** 
(0.121) 
1.558 
(0.176) 
1.735 
(0.217) 
+0.176 
(0.150) 
+0.356** 
(0.201) 
0.779 
(0.163) 
1.718 
(0.202) 
+0.940 
(0.178) 
-0.693*** 
(0.222) 
0.612 
(0.413) 
1.356 
(0.442) 
+0.744 
(0.217) 
-0.468** 
(0.235) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Security  
(T) ln(w) 
1.758 
(0.404) 
2.523 
(0.07) 
+0.764 
(0.427) 
   1.564 
(0.690) 
2.478 
(0.006) 
+0.914 
(0.697) 
2.190 
(0.202) 
2.498 
(0.172) 
+0.308 
(0.197) 
Security  
(C) ln(w) 
2.762 
(0.030) 
2.848 
(0.035) 
+0.086 
(0.024) 
+0.679*** 
(0.165) 
   2.771 
(0.073) 
2.815 
(0.071) 
+0.044 
(0.050) 
+0.870*** 
(0.462) 
2.755 
(0.033) 
2.864 
(0.046) 
+0.109 
(0.033) 
+0.199** 
(0.110) 
Security  
(T) OP2 
3.381 
(0.331) 
3.658 
(0.312) 
+0.277 
(0.093) 
   3.184 
(0.267) 
3.353 
(0.147) 
+0.170 
(0.169) 
3.457 
(0.542) 
3.751 
(0.551) 
+0.295 
(0.070) 
Security  
(C) OP2 
3.976 
(0.107) 
3.961 
(0.114) 
-0.015 
(0.064) 
+0.292** 
(0.171) 
   3.962 
(0.229) 
3.965 
(0.337) 
+0.004 
(0.121) 
+0.166 
(0.209) 
4.073 
(0.124) 
4.047 
(0.132) 
-0.026 
(0.090) 
+0.321* 
(0.243) 
Security  
(T) K/L 
0.192 
(0.420) 
0.432 
(0.430) 
+0.240 
(0.146) 
   0.456 
(0.221) 
0.752 
(0.163) 
+0.296 
(0.246) 
0.116 
(0.746) 
0.300 
(0.769) 
+0.184 
(0.114) 
Security  
(C) K/L 
0.379 
(0.248) 
0.549 
(0.288) 
+0.171 
(0.140) 
+0.069 
(0.368) 
   0.594 
(0.640) 
0.607 
(0.337) 
+0.013 
(0.467) 
+0.282 
(0.702) 
0.147 
(0.259) 
0.442 
(0.333) 
+0.295 
(0.183) 
-0.111 
(0.495) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Hairdressing  
(T) ln(w) 
2.041 
(0.099) 
2.099 
(0.095) 
+0.058 
(0.029) 
2.012 
(0.148) 
2.026 
(0.135) 
+0.014 
(0.021) 
2.100 
(0.066) 
2.220 
(0.066) 
+0.120 
(0.045) 
   
Hairdressing  
(C) ln(w) 
2.802 
(0.035) 
2.718 
(0.047) 
-0.083 
(0.037) 
+0.141*** 
(0.060) 
2.784 
(0.035) 
2.711 
(0.051) 
-0.073 
(0.043) 
+0.087 
(0.073) 
3.049 
(0.057) 
2.986 
(0.058) 
-0.062 
(0.002) 
+0.182** 
(0.067) 
   
Hairdressing  
(T) OP2 
3.184 
(0.178) 
3.108 
(0.172) 
-0.075 
(0.028) 
3.521 
(0.121) 
3.238 
(0.074) 
-0.283 
(0.142) 
3.874 
(0.146) 
3.743 
(0.089) 
-0.130 
(0.166) 
   
Hairdressing  
(C) OP2 
3.818 
(0.161) 
3.569 
(0.141) 
-0.249 
(0.106) 
+0.173 
(0.166) 
3.645 
(0.071) 
3.303 
(0.033) 
-0.341 
(0.062) 
+0.058 
(0.134) 
4.906 
(0.399) 
4.406 
(0.534) 
-0.499 
(0.135) 
+0.369 
(0.263) 
   
Hairdressing  
(T) K/L 
0.458 
(0.455) 
0.906 
(0.550) 
+0.448 
(0.233) 
0.391 
(0.524) 
0.459 
(0.585) 
+0.068 
(0.232) 
0.592 
(0.994) 
1.726 
(1.167) 
+1.134 
(0.250) 
   
Hairdressing  
(C) K/L 
0.287 
(0.229) 
1.096 
(0.247) 
+0.809 
(0.191) 
-0.361 
(0.330) 
0.328 
(0.228) 
1.313 
(0.268) 
+0.985 
(0.227) 
-0.917** 
(0.405) 
0.128 
(0.036) 
0.212 
(0.068) 
+0.084 
(0.104) 
+1.050** 
(0.380) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Textiles  
(T) ln(w) 
2.068 
(0.027) 
2.226 
(0.036) 
+0.158 
(0.026) 
1.892 
(0.043) 
1.988 
(0.050) 
+0.096 
(0.031) 
2.272 
(0.024) 
2.466 
(0.052) 
+0.193 
(0.050) 
2.254 
(0.034) 
2.338 
(0.056) 
+0.083 
(0.034) 
Textiles  
(C) ln(w) 
2.799 
(0.009) 
2.894 
(0.015) 
+0.094 
(0.012) 
+0.064*** 
(0.025) 
2.835 
(0.016) 
2.868 
(0.030) 
+0.033 
(0.024) 
+0.062** 
(0.039) 
2.790 
(0.013) 
2.898 
(0.018) 
+0.108 
(0.040) 
+0.085*** 
(0.038) 
2.777 
(0.018) 
2.899 
(0.028) 
+0.122 
(0.020) 
-0.039 
(0.037) 
Textiles  
(T) OP2 
2.671 
(0.046) 
2.744 
(0.052) 
+0.073 
(0.035) 
2.572 
(0.068) 
2.594 
(0.074) 
+0.022 
(0.075) 
2.682 
(0.078) 
2.776 
(0.094) 
+0.094 
(0.061) 
3.069 
(0.066) 
3.156 
(0.090) 
+0.173 
(0.033) 
Textiles  
(C) OP2 
3.096 
(0.037) 
3.046 
(0.040) 
-0.050 
(0.024) 
+0.123*** 
(0.041) 
3.190 
(0.066) 
3.144 
(0.067) 
-0.046 
(0.036) 
+0.069 
(0.056) 
3.016 
(0.052) 
2.908 
(0.072) 
-0.107 
(0.062) 
+0.202*** 
(0.061) 
3.164 
(0.077) 
3.144 
(0.088) 
-0.020 
(0.052) 
+0.108 
(0.088) 
Textiles  
(T) K/L 
1.177 
(0.071) 
1.483 
(0.086) 
+0.306 
(0.055) 
1.111 
(0.122) 
1.306 
(0.141) 
+0.195 
(0.077) 
1.281 
(0.099) 
1.568 
(0.119) 
+0.287 
(0.091) 
1.240 
(0.086) 
1.630 
(0.083) 
+0.389 
(0.067) 
Textiles  
(C) K/L 
2.059 
(0.051) 
2.309 
(0.057) 
+0.250 
(0.036) 
+0.056 
(0.063) 
1.727 
(0.113) 
1.876 
(0.121) 
+0.149 
(0.056) 
+0.046 
(0.094) 
2.114 
(0.065) 
2.421 
(0.068) 
+0.306 
(0.047) 
-0.019 
(0.095) 
2.504 
(0.070) 
2.656 
(0.096) 
+0.152 
(0.086) 
+0.237** 
(0.132) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Agriculture  
(T) ln(w) 
1.833 
(0.032) 
1.927 
(0.033) 
+0.094 
(0.020) 
1.806 
(0.034) 
1.854 
(0.035) 
+0.048 
(0.020) 
2.145 
(0.075) 
2.359 
(0.056) 
+0.215 
(0.073) 
0.853 
(0.445) 
1.087 
(0.462) 
+0.234 
(0.037) 
Agriculture  
(C) ln(w) 
2.761 
(0.008) 
2.833 
(0.017) 
+0.072 
(0.016) 
+0.022 
(0.026) 
2.765 
(0.010) 
2.802 
(0.018) 
+0.037 
(0.058) 
+0.011 
(0.027) 
2.756 
(0.016) 
2.897 
(0.031) 
+0.141 
(0.026) 
+0.074 
(0.063) 
2.696 
(0.033) 
2.867 
(0.048) 
+0.170 
(0.041) 
+0.064 
(0.057) 
Agriculture  
(T) OP2 
1.949 
(0.053) 
1.908 
(0.057) 
-0.041 
(0.032) 
1.941 
(0.057) 
1.908 
(0.060) 
-0.032 
(0.035) 
2.174 
(0.159) 
2.272 
(0.134) 
+0.097 
(0.129) 
1.248 
(0.376) 
1.225 
(0.297) 
-0.023 
(0.033) 
Agriculture  
(C) OP2 
2.544 
(0.053) 
2.500 
(0.053) 
-0.045 
(0.034) 
+0.004 
(0.046) 
2.476 
(0.082) 
2.414 
(0.128) 
-0.062 
(0.040) 
+0.029 
(0.053) 
2.611 
(0.103) 
2.658 
(0.092) 
+0.048 
(0.071) 
+0.049 
(0.135) 
2.219 
(0.173) 
2.339 
(0.136) 
+0.121 
(0.155) 
-0.144 
(0.214) 
Agriculture  
(T) K/L 
3.207 
(0.060) 
3.378 
(0.070) 
+0.171 
(0.037) 
3.332 
(0.066) 
3.494 
(0.074) 
+0.162 
(0.034) 
2.325 
(0.138) 
2.566 
(0.201) 
+0.241 
(0.123) 
1.759 
(0.315) 
1.796 
(0.377) 
+0.037 
(0.154) 
Agriculture  
(C) K/L 
3.544 
(0.059) 
3.743 
(0.062) 
+0.199 
(0.030) 
-0.028 
(0.048) 
3.765 
(0.065) 
3.934 
(0.073) 
+0.169 
(0.036) 
-0.007 
(0.051) 
2.886 
(0.124) 
3.205 
(0.119) 
+0.319 
(0.042) 
-0.078 
(0.104) 
2.740 
(0.169) 
2.945 
(0.170) 
+0.205 
(0.099) 
-0.168 
(0.176) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Food processing 
(T) ln(w) 
2.152 
(0.025) 
2.390 
(0.030) 
+0.238 
(0.026) 
2.045 
(0.062) 
2.179 
(0.057) 
+0.134 
(0.046) 
2.204 
(0.028) 
2.468 
(0.028) 
+0.263 
(0.031) 
2.216 
(0.033) 
2.432 
(0.045) 
+0.217 
(0.028) 
Food processing 
(C) ln(w) 
2.796 
(0.008) 
2.947 
(0.012) 
+0.150 
(0.010) 
+0.088*** 
(0.023) 
2.824 
(0.017) 
2.898 
(0.030) 
+0.074 
(0.023) 
+0.060* 
(0.046) 
2.793 
(0.011) 
2.939 
(0.015) 
+0.146 
(0.011) 
+0.117*** 
(0.026) 
2.798 
(0.015) 
2.963 
(0.019) 
+0.165 
(0.012) 
+0.051** 
(0.027) 
Food processing 
(T) OP2 
2.572 
(0.039) 
2.683 
(0.041) 
+0.111 
(0.029) 
2.458 
(0.079) 
2.609 
(0.069) 
+0.151 
(0.054) 
2.592 
(0.052) 
2.628 
(0.056) 
+0.037 
(0.036) 
2.771 
(0.091) 
2.866 
(0.084) 
+0.095 
(0.057) 
Food processing 
(C) OP2 
3.090 
(0.026) 
3.141 
(0.025) 
+0.051 
(0.017) 
+0.061** 
(0.033) 
3.008 
(0.063) 
3.072 
(0.064) 
+0.064 
(0.026) 
+0.087** 
(0.053) 
3.100 
(0.035) 
3.087 
(0.034) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
+0.050 
(0.045) 
3.164 
(0.048) 
3.273 
(0.051) 
+0.110 
(0.039) 
-0.014 
(0.076) 
Food processing 
(T) K/L 
2.089 
(0.060) 
2.204 
(0.080) 
+0.115 
(0.062) 
2.045 
(0.129) 
2.083 
(0.166) 
+0.038 
(0.103) 
2.078 
(0.080) 
2.310 
(0.089) 
+0.232 
(0.056) 
2.196 
(0.087) 
2.283 
(0.19) 
+0.087 
(0.086) 
Food processing 
(C) K/L 
2.858 
(0.038) 
3.057 
(0.036) 
+0.199 
(0.023) 
-0.084* 
(0.053) 
2.927 
(0.089) 
3.102 
(0.092) 
+0.175 
(0.044) 
-0.137* 
(0.096) 
2.736 
(0.056) 
2.956 
(0.051) 
+0.220 
(0.035) 
+0.012 
(0.068) 
3.011 
(0.061) 
3.180 
(0.064) 
+0.168 
(0.035) 
-0.081 
(0.079) 
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Table 8  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Leisure  
(T) ln(w) 
1.905 
(0.027) 
2.070 
(0.029) 
+0.166 
(0.024) 
1.826 
(0.035) 
1.986 
(0.038) 
+0.160 
(0.030) 
2.040 
(0.045) 
2.187 
(0.038) 
+0.148 
(0.042) 
2.093 
(0.062) 
2.224 
(0.062) 
+0.131 
(0.063) 
Leisure  
(C) ln(w) 
2.818 
(0.008) 
2.807 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
+0.177*** 
(0.028) 
2.825 
(0.010) 
2.821 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.018) 
+0.163*** 
(0.033) 
2.818 
(0.016) 
2.781 
(0.028) 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
+0.184*** 
(0.047) 
2.773 
(0.026) 
2.786 
(0.045) 
+0.012 
(0.039) 
+0.119** 
(0.071) 
Leisure  
(T) OP2 
1.957 
(0.052) 
1.890 
(0.057) 
-0.067 
(0.034) 
2.127 
(0.065) 
2.013 
(0.068) 
-0.114 
(0.042) 
1.260 
(0.164) 
1.203 
(0.164) 
-0.056 
(0.091) 
1.460 
(0.134) 
1.652 
(0.115) 
+0.192 
(0.111) 
Leisure  
(C) OP2 
2.446 
(0.045) 
2.356 
(0.045) 
-0.090 
(0.033) 
+0.023 
(0.048) 
2.615 
(0.050) 
2.538 
(0.051) 
-0.077 
(0.035) 
-0.037 
(0.054) 
1.918 
(0.142) 
1.903 
(0.128) 
-0.015 
(0.092) 
-0.041 
(0.131) 
1.950 
(0.145) 
1.892 
(0.132) 
-0.057 
(0.087) 
+0.249** 
(0.139) 
Leisure  
(T) K/L 
1.439 
(0.068) 
2.337 
(0.078) 
+0.898 
(0.048) 
1.436 
(0.086) 
2.239 
(0.099) 
+0.803 
(0.058) 
1.373 
(0.111) 
2.364 
(0.120) 
+0.991 
(0.075) 
1.630 
(0.245) 
2.504 
(0.272) 
+0.874 
(0.215) 
Leisure  
(C) K/L 
1.863 
(0.065) 
2.771 
(0.067) 
+0.908 
(0.035) 
-0.010 
(0.058) 
1.742 
(0.078) 
2.607 
(0.085) 
+0.865 
(0.042) 
-0.062 
(0.070) 
2.032 
(0.134) 
2.952 
(0.120) 
+0.920 
(0.070) 
+0.071 
(0.103) 
2.420 
(0.170) 
3.412 
(0.158) 
+0.992 
(0.107) 
-0.118 
(0.228) 
Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages, productivity or K/L ratio after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1% or 
better; ** 5% or better; * 10% or better. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. OP2 is productivity measure estimated by the Olley-Pakes 
modified algorithm based on a 2
nd
 order Markov process. Empty sells are due to not enough observations for large firms in the social care and hairdressing sectors and for 
small firms in the security sector.  
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Appendix 1 
Table A1  SIC and SOC coding of the low-paying sectors defined by industry and 
occupation  
Low-paying 
sector/occupation 
Old industry-based 
definition 
(SIC 2003) 
New industry-based 
definition  
(SIC 2003) 
Occupation-based 
definition  
(SOC 2000) 
Retail 52 50, 52, 71.405 711, 721, 925 
Hospitality 55 55 
5434, 9222, 9223, 
9224, 9225 
Social care (residential and 
non-residential) 
n.a. 85.3, 85.113 6115 
Cleaning 74.7 74.7, 93.01 6231, 9132, 923 
Security 74.6 74.6 9241, 9245, 9249  
Hairdressing 93.02, 93.04 93.02, 93.04 622 
Textiles and clothing n.a. 17, 18 
5414, 5419, 8113, 
8136, 8137 
Agriculture 01 – 05  01 – 05  911 
Food processing n.a. 
15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 
15.5, 15.6, 15.7, 15.8 
5431, 5432, 5433, 
8111 
Leisure, travel and sport n.a. 
92.13, 92.3, 92.6, 
92.7 
6211, 6213, 9226, 
9229 
Source: LPC 
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Figure A1  Summary of the results from the OP2 model for aggregate LPC sectors and counterfactual (A) 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.58 (t 9.94)  
 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.24 (t 1.15)  
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Figure A2  Summary of the results from the OP2 model for aggregate LPC manufacturing sectors and counterfactual 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.78 (t 11.20)  
 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.23 (t 1.02)  
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Figure A3  Summary of the results from the OP2 model for aggregate LPC service sectors and counterfactual 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.54 (t 8.36)  
 
 
 
 
Elasticity of TFP wrt NMW: 0.25 (t 1.18)  
 
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Aggregate LPC service sectors LP
NMW
Dispersion
TFP
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Aggregate LPC service sectors LP
TFP
TFPsmall
TFPmedium
TFPlarge
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Counterfactual S LP
NMW
Dispersion
TFP
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Counterfactual S LP
TFP
TFPsmall
TFPmedium
TFPlarge
 
 
61 
 
Table A2  Difference-in-differences analysis of wages and LP for the aggregate LPC sectors and counterfactual (A) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Aggregate LPC 
(T) ln(w) 
1.970 
(0.008) 
2.106 
(0.009) 
+0.136 
(0.010) 
1.916 
(0.011) 
2.023 
(0.012) 
+0.107 
(0.008) 
2.089 
(0.014) 
2.267 
(0.013) 
+0.178 
(0.014) 
1.980 
(0.025) 
2.140 
(0.024) 
+0.161 
(0.012) 
Aggregate LPC 
(C) ln(w) 
2.802 
(0.002) 
2.857 
(0.004) 
+0.055 
(0.004) 
+0.081*** 
(0.007) 
2.804 
(0.003) 
2.821 
(0.006) 
+0.017 
(0.005) 
+0.090*** 
(0.009) 
2.804 
(0.004) 
2.882 
(0.007) 
+0.078 
(0.006) 
+0.100*** 
(0.013) 
2.790 
(0.006) 
2.875 
(0.009) 
+0.085 
(0.007) 
+0.076*** 
(0.013) 
Aggregate LPC 
(T) LP 
2.508 
(0.014) 
2.548 
(0.014) 
+0.040 
(0.008) 
2.635 
(0.016) 
2.647 
(0.017) 
+0.012 
(0.009) 
2.429 
(0.026) 
2.502 
(0.026) 
+0.073 
(0.016) 
2.051 
(0.045) 
2.159 
(0.044) 
+0.108 
(0.020) 
Aggregate LPC 
(C) LP 
3.131 
(0.009) 
3.124 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
+0.046*** 
(0.010) 
3.182 
(0.013) 
3.162 
(0.014) 
-0.020 
(0.008) 
+0.032*** 
(0.012) 
3.085 
(0.016) 
3.096 
(0.016) 
+0.011 
(0.010) 
+0.062*** 
(0.017) 
2.981 
(0.030) 
2.996 
(0.033) 
+0.014 
(0.019) 
+0.094*** 
(0.027) 
Counterfactual 
A (T) ln(w) 
2.336 
(0.083) 
2.290 
(0.069) 
-0.047 
(0.038) 
2.295 
(0.094) 
2.222 
(0.080) 
-0.073 
(0.033) 
2.637 
(0.210) 
2.624 
(0.161) 
-0.013 
(0.106) 
2.478 
(0.229) 
2.531 
(0.128) 
+0.053 
(0.150) 
Counterfactual 
A (C) ln(w) 
3.051 
(0.028) 
2.981 
(0.00) 
-0.070 
(0.018) 
+0.023 
(0.046) 
3.102 
(0.041) 
3.015 
(0.031) 
-0.087 
(0.019) 
+0.014 
(0.040) 
3.032 
(0.037) 
2.966 
(0.031) 
-0.066 
(0.018) 
+0.053 
(0.083) 
2.932 
(0.071) 
2.902 
(0.059) 
-0.029 
(0.037) 
+0.082 
(0.150) 
Counterfactual 
A (T) OP2 
2.841 
(0.070) 
2.925 
(0.072) 
+0.083 
(0.059) 
2.915 
(0.069) 
2.955 
(0.074) 
+0.040 
(0.060) 
2.740 
(0.336) 
3.021 
(0.274) 
+0.281 
(0.166) 
2.056 
(0.806) 
2.451 
(0.307) 
+0.395 
(0.636) 
Counterfactual 
A (C) OP2 
3.083 
(0.029) 
3.204 
(0.028) 
+0.122 
(0.023) 
-0.038 
(0.055) 
3.239 
(0.036) 
3.341 
(0.036) 
+0.101 
(0.032) 
-0.061 
(0.064) 
2.988 
(0.056) 
3.119 
(0.052) 
+0.131 
(0.055) 
+0.150 
(0.201) 
2.763 
(0.074) 
2.792 
(0.103) 
+0.030 
(0.093) 
+0.365 
(0.408) 
Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages or productivity after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1% or better; ** 5% 
or better; * 10% or better. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. LP is labour productivity measure calculated as log of value added per 
worker.  
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Table A3  Difference-in-differences analysis of wages and LP for the manufacturing LPC sectors and counterfactual (M) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Manufacturing 
LPC (T) ln(w) 
1.963 
(0.020) 
2.099 
(0.022) 
+0.136 
(0.014) 
1.848 
(0.026) 
1.928 
(0.027) 
+0.080 
(0.016) 
2.210 
(0.023) 
2.460 
(0.025) 
+0.250 
(0.028) 
2.102 
(0.064) 
2.270 
(0.068) 
+0.168 
(0.020) 
Manufacturing 
LPC (C) ln(w) 
2.786 
(0.005) 
2.894 
(0.008) 
+0.108 
(0.007) 
+0.029** 
(0.014) 
2.796 
(0.008) 
2.843 
(0.014) 
+0.046 
(0.012) 
+0.034** 
(0.020) 
2.783 
(0.008) 
2.911 
(0.011) 
+0.128 
(0.009) 
+0.122*** 
(0.022) 
2.782 
(0.010) 
2.934 
(0.015) 
+0.152 
(0.010) 
+0.016 
(0.021) 
Manufacturing 
LPC (T) LP 
2.316 
(0.031) 
2.384 
(0.033) 
+0.068 
(0.020) 
2.346 
(0.043) 
2.373 
(0.045) 
+0.027 
(0.026) 
2.286 
(0.047) 
2.407 
(0.051) 
+0.122 
(0.036) 
2.217 
(0.074) 
2.322 
(0.084) 
+0.105 
(0.042) 
Manufacturing 
LPC (C) LP 
2.995 
(0.022) 
3.023 
(0.023) 
+0.028 
(0.015) 
+0.040** 
(0.024) 
3.066 
(0.040) 
3.061 
(0.042) 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
+0.032 
(0.035) 
2.966 
(0.029) 
2.976 
(0.031) 
+0.010 
(0.019) 
+0.112*** 
(0.038) 
2.881 
(0.040) 
2.963 
(0.046) 
+0.082 
(0.030) 
+0.023 
(0.053) 
Counterfactual 
M (T) ln(w) 
2.269 
(0.171) 
2.266 
(0.156) 
-0.003 
(0.080) 
2.157 
(0.248) 
2.119 
(0.234) 
-0.037 
(0.076) 
2.478 
(0.137) 
2.515 
(0.134) 
+0.037 
(0.051) 
2.407 
(0.422) 
2.618 
(0.066) 
+0.211 
(0.371) 
Counterfactual 
M (C) ln(w) 
2.969 
(0.036) 
2.930 
(0.026) 
-0.039 
(0.022) 
+0.036 
(0.082) 
3.070 
(0.077) 
2.997 
(0.058) 
-0.073 
(0.036) 
+0.035 
(0.088) 
2.965 
(0.037) 
2.968 
(0.028) 
+0.003 
(0.020) 
+0.034 
(0.102) 
2.861 
(0.082) 
2.897 
(0.072) 
+0.036 
(0.032) 
+0.175 
(0.186) 
Counterfactual 
M (T) LP 
2.712 
(0.118) 
2.776 
(0.126) 
+0.064 
(0.072) 
2.857 
(0.130) 
2.901 
(0.136) 
+0.044 
(0.086) 
2.124 
(0.328) 
2.222 
(0.396) 
+0.098 
(0.140) 
2.135 
(0.175) 
2.304 
(0.210) 
+0.168 
(0.136) 
Counterfactual 
M (C) LP 
2.918 
(0.030) 
2.999 
(0.032) 
+0.081 
(0.021) 
-0.017 
(0.064) 
3.149 
(0.050) 
3.223 
(0.052) 
+0.074 
(0.029) 
-0.030 
(0.071) 
2.899 
(0.042) 
2.959 
(0.044) 
+0.060 
(0.026) 
+0.037 
(0.128) 
2.619 
(0.065) 
2.656 
(0.100) 
+0.036 
(0.082) 
+0.132 
(0.459) 
Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages or productivity after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1% or better; ** 5% 
or better; * 10% or better. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. LP is labour productivity measure calculated as log of value added per 
worker. 
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Table A4  Difference-in-differences analysis of wages and LP for the service LPC sectors and counterfactual (S) 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Service LPC 
(T) ln(w) 
1.972 
(0.009) 
2.116 
(0.09) 
+0.144 
(0.008) 
1.933 
(0.013) 
2.050 
(0.012) 
+0.117 
(0.010) 
2.055 
(0.017) 
2.220 
(0.015) 
+0.165 
(0.016) 
1.955 
(0.027) 
2.112 
(0.025) 
+0.157 
(0.014) 
Service LPC 
(C) ln(w) 
2.806 
(0.003) 
2.842 
(0.005) 
+0.036 
(0.004) 
+0.108*** 
(0.008) 
2.806 
(0.004) 
2.814 
(0.006) 
+0.008 
(0.005) 
+0.109*** 
(0.011) 
2.813 
(0.005) 
2.867 
(0.008) 
+0.054 
(0.007) 
+0.110*** 
(0.016) 
2.792 
(0.008) 
2.843 
(0.011) 
+0.050 
(0.008) 
+0.107*** 
(0.016) 
Service LPC 
(T) LP 
2.558 
(0.015) 
2.590 
(0.015) 
+0.032 
(0.008) 
2.708 
(0.018) 
2.709 
(0.018) 
+0.001 
(0.010) 
2.460 
(0.030) 
2.522 
(0.031) 
+0.063 
(0.018) 
2.013 
(0.052) 
2.122 
(0.050) 
+0.109 
(0.023) 
Service LPC 
(C) LP 
3.167 
(0.010) 
3.147 
(0.011) 
-0.021 
(0.007) 
+0.052*** 
(0.010) 
3.198 
(0.013) 
3.179 
(0.014) 
-0.019 
(0.009) 
+0.020* 
(0.013) 
3.126 
(0.019) 
3.133 
(0.019) 
+0.007 
(0.012) 
+0.055*** 
(0.021) 
3.038 
(0.041) 
3.015 
(0.043) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
+0.132*** 
(0.032) 
Counterfactual 
S (T) ln(w) 
2.365 
(0.094) 
2.286 
(0.077) 
-0.079 
(0.043) 
2.326 
(0.102) 
2.252 
(0.086) 
-0.073 
(0.036) 
2.701 
(0.369) 
2.657 
(0.279) 
-0.044 
(0.186) 
2.444 
(0.328) 
2.369 
(0.289) 
-0.076 
(0.157) 
Counterfactual 
S (C) ln(w) 
3.150 
(0.041) 
2.983 
(0.028) 
-0.167 
(0.024) 
+0.088** 
(0.054) 
3.110 
(0.049) 
3.011 
(0.037) 
-0.099 
(0.022) 
+0.026 
(0.046) 
3.150 
(0.086) 
2.998 
(0.076) 
-0.152 
(0.032) 
+0.108 
(0.123) 
3.108 
(0.144) 
2.903 
(0.109) 
-0.205 
(0.101) 
+0.129 
(0.291) 
Counterfactual 
S (T) OP2 
2.901 
(0.087) 
2.995 
(0.087) 
+0.094 
(0.074) 
2.938 
(0.081) 
2.976 
(0.088) 
+0.038 
(0.074) 
3.205 
(0.468) 
3.610 
(0.309) 
+0.404 
(0.230) 
1.934 
(0.310) 
2.008 
(0.332) 
+0.074 
(0.119) 
Counterfactual 
S (C) OP2 
3.208 
(0.046) 
3.367 
(0.044) 
+0.160 
(0.038) 
-0.065 
(0.079) 
3.280 
(0.048) 
3.390 
(0.047) 
+0.110 
(0.044) 
-0.072 
(0.084) 
3.174 
(0.130) 
3.403 
(0.119) 
+0.229 
(0.143) 
+0.175 
(0.384) 
3.068 
(0.164) 
3.068 
(0.229) 
+0.000 
(0.219) 
+0.074 
(0.630) 
Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages or productivity after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1% or better; ** 5% 
or better; * 10% or better. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. LP is labour productivity measure calculated as log of value added per 
worker. 
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Table A5  Difference-in-differences analysis of wages and LP productivity measure by LPC sectors and firm size bands 
Sectors and 
subsamples 
Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Retail  
(T) ln(w) 
2.008 
(0.012) 
2.136 
(0.011) 
+0.128 
(0.010) 
1.196 
(0.016) 
2.072 
(0.015) 
+0.108 
(0.013) 
2.089 
(0.028) 
2.275 
(0.021) 
+0.186 
(0.025) 
2.117 
(0.019) 
2.242 
(0.018) 
+0.125 
(0.020) 
Retail  
(C) ln(w) 
2.813 
(0.003) 
2.865 
(0.005) 
+0.052 
(0.004) 
+0.079*** 
(0.005) 
2.808 
(0.004) 
2.830 
(0.007) 
+0.021 
(0.006) 
+0.087*** 
(0.012) 
2.831 
(0.006) 
2.910 
(0.008) 
+0.079 
(0.006) 
+0.107*** 
(0.018) 
2.805 
(0.009) 
2.882 
(0.014) 
+0.076 
(0.009) 
+0.048*** 
(0.020) 
Retail  
(T) LP 
2.801 
(0.014) 
2.826 
(0.015) 
+0.025 
(0.009) 
2.823 
(0.018) 
2.835 
(0.019) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
2.752 
(0.029) 
2.805 
(0.027) 
+0.052 
(0.018) 
2.695 
(0.045) 
2.744 
(0.045) 
+0.049 
(0.027) 
Retail  
(C) LP 
3.253 
(0.010) 
3.252 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
+0.025*** 
(0.010) 
3.243 
(0.013) 
3.242 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
+0.013 
(0.012) 
3.230 
(0.017) 
3.242 
(0.016) 
+0.012 
(0.009) 
+0.040** 
(0.019) 
3.310 
(0.033) 
3.329 
(0.034) 
+0.019 
(0.021) 
+0.030 
(0.033) 
Hospitality  
(T) ln(w) 
2.016 
(0.016) 
2.120 
(0.016) 
+0.104 
(0.013) 
1.939 
(0.026) 
2.024 
(0.028) 
+0.084 
(0.020) 
2.076 
(0.023) 
2.195 
(0.022) 
+0.119 
(0.023) 
2.046 
(0.033) 
2.190 
(0.037) 
+0.144 
(0.025) 
Hospitality  
(C) ln(w) 
2.749 
(0.008) 
2.742 
(0.013) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
+0.111*** 
(0.019) 
2.764 
(0.012) 
2.728 
(0.020) 
-0.035 
(0.016) 
+0.041*** 
(0.014) 
2.731 
(0.013) 
2.763 
(0.016) 
+0.031 
(0.013) 
+0.087*** 
(0.031) 
2.747 
(0.019) 
2.762 
(0.026) 
+0.015 
(0.018) 
+0.129*** 
(0.036) 
Hospitality  
(T) LP 
2.554 
(0.026) 
2.611 
(0.025) 
+0.057 
(0.015) 
2.687 
(0.036) 
2.722 
(0.036) 
+0.035 
(0.018) 
2.628 
(0.038) 
2.540 
(0.041) 
+0.088 
(0.024) 
2.160 
(0.098) 
2.203 
(0.104) 
+0.042 
(0.073) 
Hospitality  
(C) LP 
3.128 
(0.032) 
3.084 
(0.034) 
-0.043 
(0.017) 
+0.100*** 
(0.024) 
3.280 
(0.040) 
3.237 
(0.043) 
-0.043 
(0.025) 
+0.078*** 
(0.031) 
3.113 
(0.044) 
3.108 
(0.045) 
-0.006 
(0.024) 
+0.094*** 
(0.036) 
2.660 
(0.157) 
2.492 
(0.174) 
-0.168 
(0.095) 
+0.210** 
(0.121) 
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Table A5  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Social care  
(T) ln(w) 
1.982 
(0.046) 
2.203 
(0.046) 
+0.221 
(0.036) 
1.922 
(0.061) 
2.134 
(0.066) 
+0.212 
(0.044) 
2.080 
(0.078) 
2.358 
(0.050) 
+0.278 
(0.088) 
   
Social care  
(C) ln(w) 
2.832 
(0.017) 
2.822 
(0.025) 
-0.010 
(0.022) 
+0.231*** 
(0.046) 
2.831 
(0.022) 
2.816 
(0.035) 
-0.014 
(0.032) 
+0.227*** 
(0.058) 
2.815 
(0.032) 
2.848 
(0.043) 
+0.032 
(0.029) 
+0.246** 
(0.125) 
   
Social care  
(T) LP 
1.509 
(0.111) 
1.482 
(0.111) 
-0.028 
(0.068) 
1.626 
(0.134) 
1.524 
(0.130) 
-0.102 
(0.075) 
1.267 
(0.262) 
1.335 
(0.281) 
+0.068 
(0.075) 
   
Social care  
(C) LP 
1.862 
(0.157) 
1.670 
(0.165) 
-0.192 
(0.073) 
+0.164** 
(0.101) 
2.264 
(0.166) 
1.989 
(0.196) 
-0.274 
(0.102) 
+0.172* 
(0.124) 
1.468 
(0.263) 
1.381 
(0.272) 
-0.086 
(0.062) 
+0.154* 
(0.114) 
   
Cleaning  
(T) ln(w) 
1.598 
(0.047) 
1.815 
(0.041) 
+0.217 
(0.050) 
1.840 
(0.128) 
1.933 
(0.146) 
+0.092 
(0.078) 
1.530 
(0.135) 
1.728 
(0.103) 
+0.119 
(0.127) 
1.560 
(0.053) 
1.792 
(0.050) 
+0.231 
(0.028) 
Cleaning  
(C) ln(w) 
2.792 
(0.022) 
2.731 
(0.039) 
-0.060 
(0.029) 
+0.277*** 
(0.056) 
2.781 
(0.038) 
2.662 
(0.078) 
-0.119 
(0.058) 
+0.211** 
(0.095) 
2.804 
(0.035) 
2.800 
(0.046) 
-0.004 
(0.037) 
+0.203*** 
(0.138) 
2.797 
(0.046) 
2.722 
(0.057) 
-0.075 
(0.055) 
+0.201*** 
(0.027) 
Cleaning  
(T) LP 
1.778 
(0.079) 
1.929 
(0.077) 
+0.150 
(0.030) 
2.464 
(0.191) 
2.400 
(0.224) 
-0.064 
(0.073) 
1.948 
(0.144) 
2.033 
(0.168) 
+0.084 
(0.056) 
1.381 
(0.070) 
1.566 
(0.063) 
+0.184 
(0.034) 
Cleaning  
(C) LP 
2.808 
(0.081) 
2.791 
(0.078) 
-0.017 
(0.033) 
+0.167*** 
(0.050) 
3.030 
(0.138) 
3.026 
(0.128) 
-0.004 
(0.048) 
-0.060 
(0.086) 
2.673 
(0.116) 
2.679 
(0.106) 
+0.007 
(0.055) 
+0.077 
(0.079) 
2.365 
(0.237) 
2.355 
(0.220) 
-0.009 
(0.101) 
+0.194** 
(0.108) 
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Table A5  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Security  
(T) ln(w) 
1.758 
(0.404) 
2.523 
(0.07) 
+0.764 
(0.427) 
   1.564 
(0.690) 
2.478 
(0.006) 
+0.914 
(0.697) 
2.190 
(0.202) 
2.498 
(0.172) 
+0.308 
(0.197) 
Security  
(C) ln(w) 
2.762 
(0.030) 
2.848 
(0.035) 
+0.086 
(0.024) 
+0.679*** 
(0.165) 
   2.771 
(0.073) 
2.815 
(0.071) 
+0.044 
(0.050) 
+0.870*** 
(0.462) 
2.755 
(0.033) 
2.864 
(0.046) 
+0.109 
(0.033) 
+0.199** 
(0.110) 
Security  
(T) LP 
1.174 
(0.363) 
1.436 
(0.335) 
+0.262 
(0.068) 
   1.172 
(0.257) 
1.345 
(0.169) 
+0.173 
(0.122) 
1.205 
(0.615) 
1.508 
(0.599) 
+0.302 
(0.027) 
Security  
(C) LP 
1.756 
(0.131) 
1.673 
(0.140) 
-0.083 
(0.065) 
+0.345** 
(0.170) 
   2.086 
(0.351) 
2.038 
(0.426) 
-0.048 
(0.121) 
+0.221 
(0.218) 
1.495 
(0.101) 
1.425 
(0.124) 
-0.070 
(0.091) 
+0.372* 
(0.245) 
Hairdressing  
(T) ln(w) 
2.041 
(0.099) 
2.099 
(0.095) 
+0.058 
(0.029) 
2.012 
(0.148) 
2.026 
(0.135) 
+0.014 
(0.021) 
2.100 
(0.066) 
2.220 
(0.066) 
+0.120 
(0.045) 
   
Hairdressing  
(C) ln(w) 
2.802 
(0.035) 
2.718 
(0.047) 
-0.083 
(0.037) 
+0.141*** 
(0.060) 
2.784 
(0.035) 
2.711 
(0.051) 
-0.073 
(0.043) 
+0.087 
(0.073) 
3.049 
(0.057) 
2.986 
(0.058) 
-0.062 
(0.002) 
+0.182** 
(0.067) 
   
Hairdressing  
(T) LP 
2.188 
(0.154) 
2.209 
(0.176) 
+0.021 
(0.053) 
2.245 
(0.183) 
2.196 
(0.198) 
-0.049 
(0.045) 
2.072 
(0.312) 
2.254 
(0.413) 
+0.181 
(0.128) 
   
Hairdressing  
(C) LP 
2.744 
(0.136) 
2.654 
(0.125) 
-0.090 
(0.103) 
+0.111 
(0.162) 
2.695 
(0.123) 
2.591 
(0.144) 
-0.104 
(0.098) 
+0.055 
(0.166) 
4.138 
(0.357) 
3.969 
(0.167) 
-0.269 
(0.190) 
+0.350* 
(0.225) 
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Table A5  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Textiles  
(T) ln(w) 
2.068 
(0.027) 
2.226 
(0.036) 
+0.158 
(0.026) 
1.892 
(0.043) 
1.988 
(0.050) 
+0.096 
(0.031) 
2.272 
(0.024) 
2.466 
(0.052) 
+0.193 
(0.050) 
2.254 
(0.034) 
2.338 
(0.056) 
+0.083 
(0.034) 
Textiles  
(C) ln(w) 
2.799 
(0.009) 
2.894 
(0.015) 
+0.094 
(0.012) 
+0.064*** 
(0.025) 
2.835 
(0.016) 
2.868 
(0.030) 
+0.033 
(0.024) 
+0.062** 
(0.039) 
2.790 
(0.013) 
2.898 
(0.018) 
+0.108 
(0.040) 
+0.085*** 
(0.038) 
2.777 
(0.018) 
2.899 
(0.028) 
+0.122 
(0.020) 
-0.039 
(0.037) 
Textiles  
(T) LP 
2.290 
(0.048) 
2.460 
(0.056) 
+0.169 
(0.038) 
2.399 
(0.073) 
2.477 
(0.083) 
+0.078 
(0.042) 
2.253 
(0.080) 
2.441 
(0.100) 
+0.188 
(0.069) 
2.204 
(0.075) 
2.386 
(0.098) 
+0.182 
(0.073) 
Textiles  
(C) LP 
2.982 
(0.036) 
3.016 
(0.037) 
+0.034 
(0.025) 
+0.135*** 
(0.044) 
3.197 
(0.059) 
3.186 
(0.060) 
-0.011 
(0.035) 
+0.090** 
(0.054) 
2.900 
(0.051) 
2.885 
(0.053) 
-0.015 
(0.028) 
+0.203*** 
(0.062) 
2.890 
(0.062) 
2.927 
(0.074) 
+0.037 
(0.048) 
+0.145** 
(0.086) 
Agriculture  
(T) ln(w) 
1.833 
(0.032) 
1.917 
(0.033) 
+0.084 
(0.020) 
1.806 
(0.034) 
1.864 
(0.035) 
+0.058 
(0.020) 
2.145 
(0.075) 
2.459 
(0.056) 
+0.315 
(0.073) 
0.853 
(0.445) 
1.087 
(0.462) 
+0.234 
(0.037) 
Agriculture  
(C) ln(w) 
2.761 
(0.008) 
2.833 
(0.017) 
+0.072 
(0.016) 
+0.012 
(0.026) 
2.765 
(0.010) 
2.802 
(0.018) 
+0.037 
(0.058) 
+0.021 
(0.027) 
2.756 
(0.016) 
2.897 
(0.031) 
+0.141 
(0.026) 
+0.174*** 
(0.063) 
2.696 
(0.033) 
2.867 
(0.048) 
+0.170 
(0.041) 
+0.064 
(0.057) 
Agriculture  
(T) LP 
2.237 
(0.052) 
2.231 
(0.056) 
-0.006 
(0.032) 
2.295 
(0.056) 
2.293 
(0.060) 
-0.032 
(0.035) 
2.066 
(0.168) 
2.203 
(0.131) 
+0.137 
(0.132) 
1.051 
(0.387) 
0.928 
(0.440) 
-0.122 
(0.033) 
Agriculture  
(C) LP 
2.819 
(0.052) 
2.807 
(0.052) 
-0.012 
(0.033) 
+0.006 
(0.046) 
2.861 
(0.065) 
2.829 
(0.065) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
+0.030 
(0.053) 
2.608 
(0.101) 
2.705 
(0.090) 
+0.097 
(0.071) 
+0.040 
(0.137) 
1.997 
(0.463) 
2.076 
(0.150) 
+0.078 
(0.410) 
-0.201 
(0.472) 
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Table A5  Continued 
Sectors Total sample Small firms Medium firms Large firms 
Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference Pre 
1999 
Post 
1999 
Difference 
Food processing 
(T) ln(w) 
2.152 
(0.025) 
2.390 
(0.030) 
+0.238 
(0.026) 
2.045 
(0.062) 
2.179 
(0.057) 
+0.134 
(0.046) 
2.204 
(0.028) 
2.468 
(0.028) 
+0.263 
(0.031) 
2.216 
(0.033) 
2.432 
(0.045) 
+0.217 
(0.028) 
Food processing 
(C) ln(w) 
2.796 
(0.008) 
2.947 
(0.012) 
+0.150 
(0.010) 
+0.088*** 
(0.023) 
2.824 
(0.017) 
2.898 
(0.030) 
+0.074 
(0.023) 
+0.060* 
(0.046) 
2.793 
(0.011) 
2.939 
(0.015) 
+0.146 
(0.011) 
+0.117*** 
(0.026) 
2.798 
(0.015) 
2.963 
(0.019) 
+0.165 
(0.012) 
+0.051** 
(0.027) 
Food processing 
(T) LP 
2.450 
(0.040) 
2.582 
(0.042) 
+0.133 
(0.029) 
2.530 
(0.083) 
2.696 
(0.075) 
+0.167 
(0.050) 
2.435 
(0.051) 
2.514 
(0.058) 
+0.079 
(0.039) 
2.429 
(0.091) 
2.532 
(0.092) 
+0.103 
(0.057) 
Food processing 
(C) LP 
3.128 
(0.028) 
3.215 
(0.027) 
+0.087 
(0.017) 
+0.046* 
(0.034) 
3.298 
(0.064) 
3.403 
(0.066) 
+0.105 
(0.027) 
+0.062 
(0.052) 
3.124 
(0.039) 
3.155 
(0.038) 
+0.030 
(0.024) 
+0.049 
(0.048) 
2.951 
(0.052) 
3.084 
(0.057) 
+0.134 
(0.039) 
-0.030 
(0.076) 
Leisure  
(T) ln(w) 
1.905 
(0.027) 
2.070 
(0.029) 
+0.166 
(0.024) 
1.826 
(0.035) 
1.986 
(0.038) 
+0.160 
(0.030) 
2.040 
(0.045) 
2.187 
(0.038) 
+0.148 
(0.042) 
2.093 
(0.062) 
2.224 
(0.062) 
+0.131 
(0.063) 
Leisure  
(C) ln(w) 
2.818 
(0.008) 
2.807 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.016) 
+0.177*** 
(0.028) 
2.825 
(0.010) 
2.821 
(0.019) 
-0.004 
(0.018) 
+0.163*** 
(0.033) 
2.818 
(0.016) 
2.781 
(0.028) 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
+0.184*** 
(0.047) 
2.773 
(0.026) 
2.786 
(0.045) 
+0.012 
(0.039) 
+0.119** 
(0.071) 
Leisure  
(T) LP 
2.490 
(0.051) 
2.490 
(0.056) 
+0.000 
(0.034) 
2.550 
(0.064) 
2.490 
(0.068) 
-0.059 
(0.042) 
1.976 
(0.166) 
1.999 
(0.166) 
+0.023 
(0.091) 
2.378 
(0.139) 
2.665 
(0.119) 
+0.287 
(0.113) 
Leisure  
(C) LP 
3.016 
(0.044) 
3.000 
(0.044) 
-0.016 
(0.033) 
+0.015 
(0.048) 
3.079 
(0.049) 
3.067 
(0.050) 
-0.011 
(0.035) 
-0.048 
(0.054) 
2.675 
(0.144) 
2.743 
(0.131) 
+0.067 
(0.093) 
-0.044 
(0.131) 
3.007 
(0.139) 
3.051 
(0.126) 
+0.044 
(0.082) 
+0.243** 
(0.137) 
Note: Figures in italics indicate the difference-in-differences and figures in bold indicate sectors and firm size groups with statistically significant (at 10% or better) 
difference-in-differences in wages or productivity after the implementation of the NMW in 1999. The levels of significance are denoted as follows: *** 1% or better; ** 5% 
or better; * 10% or better. (T) denotes the treatment group and (C) denotes the comparison group. LP is labour productivity measure calculated as log of value added per 
worker. 
